DESIGNS ON SIGNS / MYTH AND MEANING IN MAPS

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ABSTRACT

Every map is at once a synthesis of signs and a sign in itself: an instrument of depiction – of objects, events, places – and an instrument of persuasion – about these, its makers and itself. Like any other sign, it is the product of codes: conventions that prescribe relations of content and expression in a given semiotic circumstance. The codes that underwrite the map are as numerous as its motives, and as thoroughly naturalized within the culture that generates and exploits them. Intrinsignificant codes govern the formation of the cartographic icon, the deployment of visible language, and the scheme of their joint presentation. These operate across several levels of integration, activating a repertoire of representational conventions and syntactical procedures extending from the symbolic principles of individual marks to elaborate frameworks of cartographic discourse. Extrasignificant codes govern the appropriation of entire maps as sign vehicles for social and political expression – of values, goals, aesthetics and status – as the means of modern myth. Map signs, and maps as signs, depend fundamentally on conventions, signify only in relation to other signs, and are never free of their cultural context or the motives of their makers.

Spread out on the table before us is the Official State Highway Map of North Carolina. It happens to be the 1978–79 edition. Not for any special reason: it just came to hand when we were casting about for an example. If you don't know this map, you can well enough imagine it, a sheet of paper – nearly two by four feet – capable of being folded into a handy pocket or glove compartment sized four by seven inches. One side is taken up by an inventory of North Carolina points of interest – illustrated with photos of, among other things, a scimitar horned oryx (resident in the state zoo), a Cherokee woman making beaded jewelry, a ski lift, a sand dune (but no cities) –, a ferry schedule, a message of welcome from the then governor, and a motorist's prayer (“Our heavenly Father, we ask this day a particular blessing as we take the wheel of our car ...”). On the other side, North Carolina, hemmed in by the margins of pale yellow South Carolinas and Virginias, Georgias and Tennesses, and washed by a pale blue Atlantic, is represented as a meshwork of red, black, blue, green and yellow lines on a white background, thickened at the intersections by roundels of black or blotches of pink. There is about it something of veins and arteries seen through translucent skin, and if you stare at it long enough you can even convince yourself that blood is actually pulsing through them. Constellated about this image are, inter alia, larger scale representations of ten urban places and the Blue Ridge Parkway, an index of cities and towns, a highly selective mileage chart, a few safety tips and ... yes, a legend (Figure 1).

LEGENDS

It doesn't say so, of course, but it is all the same. What it says is, “North Carolina Official Highway Map / 1978–79.” To the left of this title is a sketch of the fluttering state flag. To the right is a sketch of a cardinal (state bird) on a branch of flowering dogwood (state flower) surmounting a buzzing honey bee arrested in midflight (state insect). Below these, four headings in red – ‘Road Classifications,’ ‘Map Symbols,’ ‘Populations of Cities and Towns’ and ‘Mileages’ – organize collections of marks and their verbal equivalents (thus, a red dot is followed by the words ‘Welcome Center’). We will return to these in a moment, but for the sake of

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FIGURE 1. The '1978–79 North Carolina Transportation Map & Guide To Points of Interest.' That's what it says on the cover fold. The map image proper is titled on the legend block as the 'North Carolina Official Highway Map 1978–79,' whereas the headline on the other side of the sheet reads, 'North Carolina Points of Interest.' Unfortunately the distinctions among the pale blue, yellow, pink and white are all but lost in this reproduction. (North Carolina Department of Transportation.)

FIGURE 2. The legend block from the '1978–79 North Carolina Transportation Map & Guide To Points of Interest.' Again, it's too bad you can't appreciate the color. (North Carolina Department of Transportation.)

completeness it should be noted that below these one finds graphic and verbal scales (in miles and kilometers), as well as the pendent sentence, "North Carolina's highway system is the Nation's largest State-maintained Network. Hard surfaced roads lead to virtually every scenic and vacation spot."

Clearly this legend – to say nothing of the rest of the map – carries a heavy burden, one that reflects aggressively the uses to which this map was put (Figure 2). We stress the plural because it is a fact, not so much overlooked (cartographers are not that naive), but nonetheless ordinarily ignored, denied, suppressed. For
certainly in this case the first and primary ‘user’ was the State of North Carolina, which used the map as a promotional device (in this context ‘used’ comes naturally), as an advertisement more likely than most to be closely looked at, even carefully preserved (because of its other uses), and so one given away at Welcome Centers just inside the state’s borders, at Visitor Centers elsewhere, from booths at the State Fair, and in response to requests from potential tourists, immigrants and industrial location specialists. This is all perfectly obvious in ‘The Guide to Points of Interest’ and the selection of photographs that decorate it (unless we have the emphasis backwards, and the ‘Guide’ is first of all a way of justifying the photographs, like text in the National Geographic Magazine), but it is no less evident in the legend itself.

Nor is it here just a matter of the unavoidable presence of the state flag, flower, bird and insect – though there they are in children’s encyclopedia colors —, but primarily of what else the map’s makers have chosen for the legend and the ways they have chosen to organize it (for more than one principle of order operates under even seemingly straightforward subheadings such as ‘Populations of Cities and Towns’). It is conventional to pretend, as Robinson and Sale have put it, that “legends or keys are naturally indispensable to most maps, since they provide the explanations of the various symbols used,” but that this is largely untrue hardly needs belaboring. Legends flare into cartographic consciousness not much earlier than thematic maps, are nonetheless still dispensed with more often than not, and never provide explanations of more than a portion of the ‘symbols’ found on the maps to which they refer. Their essential absence from, say, United States Geological Survey topographic survey sheets, or the plates of a Rand McNally International Atlas, makes this all too clear. That legends do exist for these maps — someplace in the book, or by special order — only serves to underscore, through their entirely separate, off-somewhere-else character, exactly how dispensable they really are.

Nor is this dispensability a result of the ‘self-explanatory’ quality of the map symbols, for, though Robinson and Sale might insist that, “no symbol that is not self-explanatory should be used on a map unless it is explained in a legend,” the fact is that no symbol explains itself, stands up and says, ‘Hi, I’m a lock,’ or ‘We’re marsh,’ anymore than the words of an essay bother to explain themselves to the reader. Most readers make it through most essays (and maps) because as they grew up through their common culture (and into their common culture), they learned the significance of most of the words (and map symbols). Those they don’t recognize they puzzle out through context, or simply skip, or ask somebody to explain. A few texts come with glossaries, though like map legends these are rarely consulted and readily dispensed with. But this familiarity with signs on the part of the reader never becomes a property of the mark, and even the most obvious, transparent sign remains opaque to those unfamiliar with the code.

It is not, then, that maps don’t need to be decoded; but that they are by and large encoded in signs as readily interpreted by most map readers as the simple prose into which the marks are translated on the legends themselves. For at best legends less ‘explain’ the marks than ‘put them into words,’ so that should the words mean nothing the legend is rendered less helpful than the map image itself, where
the signs at least have a context and the chance to spread themselves a little (as anyone who has read a map in a foreign language can attest). One way to appreciate this while approaching an understanding of the role legends actually play is to take a look at those signs on maps that don’t make it onto the legend, of, for instance, this *North Carolina Official Highway Map*. Concentrating for the moment on the map image of the state proper, ignoring, that is, the little maps of the state’s larger cities, the inset of the Blue Ridge Parkway, the mileage chart (the instructions for which do happen to be pasted over the map image proper, though over South Carolina, just below Kershaw), the guide to other transportation information sources, the borders and rules, and the letters, numbers and other marks that facilitate the operations of the index of cities and towns — though to pretend that any of this is half as self-evident as the signs on the map image is to miss how laboriously we have learned to interpret the architecture of this picture plane, how much we have come to take for granted — still, ignoring all this, and all the words, and somehow managing to overlook that logo of the North Carolina Department of Transportation floating on the Atlantic some twenty miles due east of Cape Fear, it is nevertheless the case that eighteen signs deployed on the map image *do not appear on the legend*. That’s half as many as do.

Why don’t they? It’s not, certainly, because they’re self-explanatory. No matter how many readers are convinced that blue naturally and unambiguously asserts the presence of water, or that little pictograms of lighthouses and mountains explain themselves, signs are *not* signs for, dissolve into marks for, those who don’t know the code. *Look at these:* where, in the eyes and eyebrows of Mt. Sterling, can anyone see the mountain: or, in the pair of upended nail pullers, the lighthouse at Cape Fear? (Figures 3 and 4). Nor is there anything more ‘self-evident’ about the use of blue for water. Not only historically has water been rendered in red, black, white, brown, pink and green, but it disports in other colors on the obverse of this very map: in silver and white on the ‘cover’ photo of Atlantic surf; in tawny-pewter in the photograph of fishing boats at anchor; in warm silver-gray in a shot of the moonlit ocean off Wrightsville Beach; and in yellow-green in the photograph of the stream below Looking Glass Falls. Only in the falls, where it indicates shadows, is there blue in any of these waters. This lack of any sort of ‘necessary’ or ‘natural’ coupling between blue and water proves fortuitous, for the color used to represent water on the map image does double-duty as background for the sheet as a whole, and surely we were never intended to read the circumjacent margin for a circumfluent ocean. There’s no way around it: each of these signs is a perfectly conventional way of saying what is said (‘lighthouse,’ ‘mountain,’ ‘water’) – which is why the map *seems* so transparent, so easy to read. But *were* the function of the legend to explain such conventions (or at least translate them into words), then these would belong on it as surely as those that are there.

And if these belong there, so do the yellow tint used for ‘other states,’ the white used for ‘North Carolina,’ the thick continuous green-with-dashed-red line that asserts ‘National Park’ and the thick continuous yellow-with-long-short-dashed-black line that stutters ‘county’ (so long as the border isn’t along or over water). These all may be equally conventional, but they are less vernacular than the blue for water and so are open to greater misconstrual, especially on a map on
which a long-short-short dashed black line mutters 'state', a continuous blue line murmurs 'coast' or 'bank', a fine dashed red line coughs at 'military reservation', a slightly thicker dashed red line says 'Indian reservation', and a still thicker one proclaims 'Appalachian Trail'. A fine dashed line in black whispers 'national wildlife refuge'. A continuous line in red hints, in degrees, at the graticule.

Yet, while all these signs are absent, on the legend we find interpretative distinctions made among the shapes and colors of the roadsigns of the Interstate, federal and state highway systems. Does the person really exist for whom the graticule is self-evident, yet the highway signs obscure? No, there is no such human being, though doubtless there are many immured in subtleties of the highway signage system to whom the graticule and its associated cabalism of degrees and minutes is a deep mystery. What becomes gradually clear is that if the purpose of the legend ever were 'explanation,' everything is backwards: the things least likely to be most widely known are the very things about which the legend is reticent, while with respect to precisely those aspects both natives and travellers are most sure to be familiar, the legend is positively garrulous. Garrulous, not necessarily informative: the signs under 'Road Classifications' comprise less a system than a yardsale of marks, many of which remain, despite their inclusion on the legend, 'unexplained.' What is one to make, for instance, of the three marks given for 'Hard Surface Roads'? Are we to distinguish among solid red, solid black and enclosed, dashed blue? Or are these just three arbitrary ways of designating the same reality? Suggestions of system inevitably evaporate under the heat of
attention: about the time you've concluded that red is the color of federal highways, you run down US 74B in black; and by the time you've decided that unnumbered state roads are in enclosed, dashed blue, you realize you don't have the foggiest idea what that means. There are another three equally vague signs for highways under construction; and another two for multilane. There would seem to be an interest in portraying access (controlled or not), jurisdiction (federal or state), condition (constructed, under construction), composition (hard surface, gravel, soil) and carrying capacity (multilane or not) but not enough interest to force anybody to confront the graphic complexity implied by a five-dimensional code. Nor is this mess limited to the 'Road Classifications' portion of the legend. Of the seven signs under 'Populations of Cities and Towns,' only four relate to population, and these do so without consistency. The state capital, county seats and '24 Hour Hospital Emergency Service' have individual designations confusingly related to the signs of population. Thus, the sign for 'State Capital' is circular like the signs for towns with less than 10,000 people; but the 'County Seat' sign is some kind of lozenge. The sign for 'Emergency Service' is a bright blue asterisk.

We can see your lips moving as you read this. They're saying, "What a sad sack of a map! My undergraduates could do better." But that's not true. Undergraduates would collapse if confronted with a task of this complexity. The design problems alone would give them fits (not to mention compilation et cetera et cetera), but the political realities would destroy them, the demands of interagency collaboration, for example (for while one side of our map was handled by the Department of Transportation, the other was produced by the Department of Commerce), the rigors of pleasing state senators and representatives, the imperative to manifest those miniscule but vital tokens of partisanship that distinguish the map of a Republican administration from that of the Democrats. Nor is it such a sad sack of a map. It's a fair example of the genre. It's indistinguishable, for instance, from the Illinois Official Highway Map, 1985–86; from the Michigan Great Lake State Official Transportation Map for 1974 (which makes up for the omission of its state insect by illustrating inter alia the state gem [greenstone], state fish [trout] and state stone [petoskey]); and it's a lot less weird than the Texas – 1976 Official Highway Travel Map, which in an attempt at shaded relief manages only to look badly singed. All the maps of the genre, and most other genres as well, are characterized by legends (like ours) which in a more or less muddled fashion put into words map signs that are so customary as to be widely understood without the words, while leaving the map images themselves littered with conventions it taxes professional cartographers to put into English.

**MYTHS**

Invariably the knee-jerk reaction is either to pooh-pooh the examples, no matter how many times multiplied, as bad (as in, "Those are just bad maps!") or to call for a revolution in the design of their legends ('Rethinking Legends for the State Highway Map'). Both completely miss the point. *There is nothing wrong with the design of these legends: they are supposed to be the way they are.* This will be difficult for
many to accept, but once it is understood that the role of the legend is less to elucidate the 'meaning' of this or that map element than to function as a sign in its own right, this conclusion is even more difficult to evade. Just as the bright blue asterisk signifies '24 Hour Hospital Emergency Service' so the legend as a whole is itself a signifier. As such, the legend refers not to the map (or at least not directly to the map), but back, through a judicious selection of map elements, to that to which the map image itself refers, to the state. It is North Carolina that is signified in the legend, not the elements of the map image, though it is the selection of map elements and their disposition within the legend box that encourages the transformation of the legend into a sign. It is a sign only a cartographer (or graphic designer) could fail to understand. Others receive in a glance, naively or otherwise, this sign of North Carolina's subtly mingled automotive sophistication, urbanity and leisure opportunity. Apprehended this way, the legend makes sense. The headings in red — heretofore so bizarre — appear now as headlines to a jingoist text. Under the fluttering flag, the words, 'Road Classifications.' Plural. North Carolina's road system is so rich, that one classification can't handle it. And across the legend, under the bucolic branch cum bird (read 'rural,' read 'traditional values') and the bee if you can see it (read 'hard working' [read 'no unions']), the words, 'Populations of Cities and Towns.' Cities and towns and birds and bees. It is almost too much, though as it says on the 1986–1987 edition of this map, 'North Carolina has it all.'

It certainly has a lot of whatever it is. Look at those road signs! Their proliferation can no longer be seen as a manifestation of graphic and taxonomic chaos, though, but as a sign insisting that roads really are what North Carolina's all about. The sign's abundant density supports the presumption of the headline and justifies the proximity of the flag. That there are more signifiers than signifieds is no longer a mystery to be explained, but part of the answer to the question, “Does North Carolina really have a lot of roads?” It's the graphic analogue to the assertion in black at the bottom of the legend box that reads “North Carolina's highway system is the Nation's largest State-maintained Network.” What the roads connect, of course, are all those cities. It's wonderful the way it takes seven signs and four lines to unfold the complexities of what the cartographer can't help observing is but a four tier urban hierarchy. Again, it's the graphic equivalent of a remark from the governor's letter on the other side of the map about 'booming' cities. Hey: this is a hip state (though bucolic), urban, urbane, sophisticated (but built on traditional values). The whiff of sophistication is heightened by the kilometer scale, so European, almost risqué, though it's carefully isolated in the lower right hand corner of the legend under the heading, 'Mileages'. Roads and cities: roads to and from cities, that is, the very desideratum for anyone looking to locate, say, a plant somewhere in the South. Modern, in other words, up-to-date. But as the bird and branch and honey bee remind us, not off the wall.

And yet it's not all work either. In between, in between moments, in between the roads and the cities and towns, in between the signs for the roads and the cities and towns, under the innocuous heading 'Map Symbols' (which from its central position also casts its net over all the map signs on the legend), may be found the signs for fun, clean fun, good clean fun, but still fun: 'Park Campsites,' 'State and
National Forest,' 'Welcome Center,' 'Rest Area' and 'Points of Interest,' to say nothing of the signs for still other ways of getting around, ferries, railroads and three kinds of airports. Led by that bright green forest sign that visually lies at the center of the legend (read 'parks'), this heterogeneity speaks of caring for people ('Welcome Center,' 'Rest Area') and is the graphic version of the remainder of that black sentence that sums up the legend (and is counterpoised at the bottom against 'North Carolina' at the top): 'Hard surfaced roads [for which there are three signs] lead to virtually every scenic and vacation spot.'

Wow! It's almost overdone. Had it been done up slick by some heavy duty design firm, it would have been overdone. But here, it's just hokey enough to seem sincere. It is sincere. We don't believe for a minute anyone sat down and cynically worked this thing out, carefully offsetting the presumptuousness of the overheated highway symbolism with the self-effacing quality of the children's encyclopedia colors. But this is not to say that with this legend we are not in the presence of what Roland Barthes has called 'myth' --a kind of 'speech' better defined by its intention than its literal sense.

Barthean myth is invariably constructed from signs which have been already constructed out of a previous alliance of a signifier and a signified. An example, an especially innocuous one, is given by the reading of a Latin sentence, 'quia ego nominor leo,' in a Latin grammar:

There is something ambiguous about this statement: on the one hand, the words in it do have a simple meaning: *because my name is lion*. And on the other, the sentence is evidently there in order to signify something else to me. Inasmuch as it is addressed to me, a pupil in the second form, it tells me clearly: I am a grammatical example meant to illustrate the rule about the agreement of the predicate. I am even forced to realize that the sentence in no way signifies its meaning to me, that it tries very little to tell me something about the lion and what sort of name he has; its true and fundamental signification is to impose itself on me as the presence of a certain agreement of the predicate. I conclude that I am faced with a particular, greater, semiological system, since it is co-extensive with the language: there is, indeed, a signifier, but this signifier is itself formed by a sum of signs, it is in itself a first semiological system (*my name is lion*). Thereafter, the formal pattern is correctly unfolded: there is a signified (*I am a grammatical example*) and there is a global signification, which is none other than the correlation of the signifier and the signified; for neither the naming of the lion nor the grammatical example is given separately.

The parallels with our legend are pronounced. On the one hand, it too is loaded with simple meanings: *where on the map you find a red square, on the ground you will find a point of interest*. But as we have seen, the legend little commits itself to the unfurling of these meanings, even compared to the map image on which each is actually named – 'Singletary Lake Group Camp' or 'World Golf Hall of Fame.' The appearance of the red square on the legend thus adds nothing to our ability to understand the map. Instead it imposes itself on us as an assertion that North Carolina has points of interest, speaks through the map about the state. Yet as in Barthes' example, this assertion about North Carolina is constructed out of, stacked on top of, the simpler significance of the red square on the legend, namely, to be identified with the words, 'Points of Interest.'
We thus have a two-tiered semiological system in which the simpler is appropriated by the more complex. Barthes has represented this relationship in the following way (Figure 5):\(^5\)

In our case, at the level of language we have as signifier the various marks that appear on the legend: the red square, the black dashed line, the bright blue asterisk; and as signified the respective phrases: 'Points of Interest,' 'Ferry' and '24 Hour Hospital Emergency Service.' Taken together, the marks and phrases are signs, things which *in their sign function* are no longer usefully taken for themselves (there is no red square 350 yards on a side at Singletary Lake) but as indicative of or as pointing toward something else (a point of interest called Singletary Lake Group Camp). Collectively, these signs comprise the legend, but this in turn is a signifier in another semiological system cantilevered out from the first. At this level of myth we have as signified some version of what it might mean to be in North Carolina, some idea of its attractiveness (at least to a specifiable consumer), a concept signed also in the photos decorating the other side of the map, in the governor's message, in the 'Motorist's Prayer,' a concept we could call 'North Carolinanness.' The signifier is of course the legend appropriated from the level of language by this myth to be its sign. Insidiously, this myth is not required to declare itself in language: this is its power. At the moment of reception, it evaporates: the legend is only a legend after all. One sees only its neutrality, its innocence. *What else could it be? It is after all a highway map!*

Indeed. *And so it is.* It is precisely this ambiguity that enables myth to work without being seen. Hidden on top of a primary semiological system, it resists transformation into symbols. As a legend or a map or a photograph, it retains always the fullness, the presence, of the primary semiological system to which it is endlessly capable of retreating. What viewed obliquely appears an advertising slogan, confronted directly is the blandest of legends, so that the slogan, still
ringing in one's ears, is apprehended as no more than the natural echo of the facts of the map. It is in this way that North Carolinanness comes to be accepted as an attribute of the terrain instead of being seen as the promotional posture of state government it actually is. This constitutes, in Barthes' phrase, "the naturalization of the cultural":

This is why myth is experienced as innocent speech: not because its intentions are hidden — if they were hidden they could not be efficacious — but because they are naturalized. In fact, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that he does not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. Where there is only an equivalence, he sees a kind of causal process: the signifier and the signified have, in his eyes, a natural relationship. This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any semiological system is a system of values; now the myth consumer takes the signification for a system of facts: myth is read as a factual system, whereas it is but a semiological system.  

Not seen as a semiological system: this is the heart of the matter. Of all the systems so not seen, is there one more invisible than the cartographic? The most fundamental cartographic claim is to be a system of facts, and its history has most often been written as the story of its ability to present those facts with ever increasing accuracy. That this system can be corrupted everyone acknowledges: none are more vehement in their exposure of the 'propaganda map' than cartographers, but having denounced this usage they feel but the freer in passing off their own products as untainted by the very values which alone constitute the structure of a semiological system. It may no longer appear that an official state highway map is quite such a system of facts as it might previously have been supposed; but this is essentially a consequence of our presentation. Outside of this context, a highway map is accepted as inevitable, as about as natural a thing as can be imagined. Its presence in glove compartments, gas station racks and the backs of kitchen drawers is taken for granted. Yet as we have shown, even so innocent a part of the map as the legend carries an exhausting burden of myth, to say nothing of the prayer, governor’s message, photographs and other paraphernalia cosseting the map image itself.

Nor does the map image escape the grasp of myth. On the contrary, it is more mythic precisely to the degree that it succeeds in persuading us that it is a natural consequence of perceiving the world. A state highway map, for instance, is unavoidably a map of the state: that is, an instrument of state polity, an assertion of sovereignty. There was, for example, no need from the perspective of the driver to have colored yellow the states contiguous to North Carolina on its highway map. There was no real need to have shown the border. It is not, after all, as though the laws regulating traffic changed much at the borders, though to the extent they do, the map is silent. At this level of language the map, like the legend, seems to proffer vital information; but it's an impression hard to sustain: there is too little information to make what's provided useful. Like the legend, the map in this regard makes no sense. From the perspective of myth, however, this delineation of the state's borders is of the essence. Though many will see in this only the most dispassionate neutrality (what could be more natural than the inclusion of the
state's borders on its highway map?), there is nothing innocent about the map's affirmation of North Carolina's dominion over the land in white. Not only has effective territorial control long been dependent on effective mapping, but it is among other things the repetitive impact of the image of the territory mapped that lends credence to the claims of control (and hence the extensive logogrammatic application of the state's outline to seals, badges and emblems). Who would question the pretensions, the right to existence, the reality of North Carolina? Look! There it is on the map! The 1.6 million copies of the 1986-1987 edition of this map constitute 1.6 million assertions of the state's sovereignty, assertions which, however, at the moment of being noticed have the ability to fade back into the map where their appearance is taken entirely for granted, overlooked because expected, naturally a part of the surface.

Which is myth's way: the map is always there to deny that the significations piled on top of it are there at all. It is only a map after all, and the pretense is that it is innocent, a servant of the eye that sees things as they really are. But outside the world of speech, outside the world of maps, states carry on a precarious existence: little of nature, they are much of maps, for to map a state is to assert its territorial expression, to leave it off to deny its existence. Only when it is admitted that a state unrecognized (unmapped) is scarcely a state, that it is the determination (choice) of people to acknowledge (map) it that endows with substance an assertion of statehood, or not to acknowledge (map) it that relieves it of significance, is it possible to comprehend the anger directed at maps that acknowledge the independent existence of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda; that deny the independent existence of Taiwan; or that, for that matter, run county borders through Indian Reservations, such as those of Swain and Jackson through the Cherokee Indian Qualla Boundary on the North Carolina highway map. It is not that the map is right or wrong (it is not a question of accuracy), but that it takes a stand while pretending to be neutral on an issue over which people are divided. Nor is it that those angered have confused the map with the terrain, but that they recognize what cartographers are at such pains to deny, that, like it or not, willingly or unwillingly, because _au fond_ maps constitute a semiological system (that is, a system of values), they are ever vulnerable to seizure or invasion by myth. They are consequently, in all ways less like the windows through which we view the world and more like those windows of appearance from which pontiffs and potentates demonstrate their suzerainty, not because cartographers necessarily want it this way, but because given the manner in which systems of signs operate, they have no choice.

Paradoxically, it is an absence of choice founded on choice alone, for to choose is to reveal a value, and a map is a consequence of choices among choices. That the choice of mapping Bophuthatswana as an independent nation reveals a political attitude is something many will readily concede. But all choices are political, and it is no less revealing to choose to map _highways_, for this also is a value. That it would be difficult to produce a state highway map without highways is admitted, but there is no injunction on the state to map its roads anymore than there is for it to map the locations of deaths attributable to motor vehicles, or the density of cancer-linked emissions from internal combustion engines, or the extent of noise pollution associated with automotive traffic. It would be satisfying
to live in a state that produced 1.6 million copies of such maps and distributed them free of cost to travellers, tourists, immigrants and industrial location specialists, but states find it more expedient to publish maps of highways. North Carolina does publish the North Carolina Public Transportation Guide — a highway map-like document displaying intercity bus, train and ferry routes — but it printed 15,000 copies of the most recent edition, less than a hundredth as many maps as it printed of its highways. Not an advertisement, the public transportation map was produced without the assistance of the Department of Commerce. Could this be why, unlike the highway map among whose blond hikers, swimmers, golfers and white-water enthusiasts no blacks appear, blacks figure so prominently on the public transportation map? Here blacks buy intercity bus tickets, get on city buses, and in wheel chairs get assisted into specially equipped vans. The reek of special assistance is like sweat: "Many of you have requested information on how to make your trip without using a private automobile. Because of these requests..." but there is nothing of this tone on the highway map. There was never any need to have requested a highway map: it, after all, is a natural function of the state. Everything conspires to this end of naturalizing the highway map (even the map of public transportation), of making the decision to produce such a map seem less a decision and more a gesture of instinct, of making its cultural, its historical, its political imperatives transparent: you see through them, and there is only the map, innocent, of nature, of the world as she really is.

CODES

It is, of course, an illusion: there is nothing natural about a map. It is a cultural artifact, a cumulation of choices made among choices every one of which reveals a value: not the world, but a slice of a piece of the world; not nature but a slant on it; not innocent, but loaded with intentions and purposes; not directly, but through a glass; not straight, but mediated by words and other signs; not, in a word, as it is, but in code. And of course it's in code: all meaning, all significance derives from codes, all intelligibility depends on them. For those who found their codes in the breakfast cereal box — little cardboard wheels arbitrarily linking letters and numbers — this generalization of the idea may occasion some disquiet. It shouldn't. When you wear a tie to work, you're dressing in code. When you frown, you're expressing in code. When you open a door for a lady — or wait for a man to open a door for you —, you're gallanting in code. When you type or scribble, you're writing in code. Human languages are probably the most elaborate and complex codes we're familiar with — and the dictionary just a big clumsy breakfast cereal toy — but there are sublinguistic codes of incredible sophistication (those danced by Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire) and supralinguistic codes of deep subtlety (such as the conventions underwriting the structure of James Joyce's Ulysses). Usually a number of different codes are used simultaneously (this is a text). Fred and Ginger were placed in settings, dressed, wore their hair a certain way, gestured, spoke and sang as well as danced and all was coded. The code of conventions structuring Ulysses cannot be encountered outside the code of English in which it is embedded. There is even a code of codes: a mime, for example, is forbidden the code of words, and in general the arts are distinguished by a code whose elements
are other codes. It has long been a hallmark of cartography that it speaks in art as well as science.

More technically a code can be said to be an assignment scheme (or rule) coupling or apportioning items or elements from a conveyed system (the signified) to a conveying system (the signifier). The highway code is paradigmatic of the way this works. On the one side are intentions (she intends to turn), promises (Holly Springs will be encountered three miles down this road) and commands (not to pass, to stop, to go). On the other side are gestures (a hand stuck straight out the driver’s window), words and numbers (‘Holly Springs/3 miles’), and lights and lines (a red traffic light, a solid yellow line down the middle of the road). The intentions, promises and commands are elements of the system conveyed: signifieds (content). The gestures, words, numbers, lines and lights are elements of the system conveying (expression). The code (the rule — in this case, the Law) assigns the latter to the former, couples them. In so doing, it creates a sign.

An important distinction is being made here. The sign is not in the gestures or the lights, the words or the numbers: it is not the signifier. Nor is the sign in the intentions, promises or commands: it is not the signified. The sign exists solely, utterly and exclusively in its correlation (established by the code, the rule, by custom, by the law). There is nothing, for instance, inevitable (necessary) in the relationship between a driver sticking his arm straight out the left window and his intention to turn left (and in fact it has been largely supplanted by the flashing of lights on the left side of the car), any more than there is between a driver pointing to heaven and his intention to turn right (though doubtless there was some historical contingency that made it customary). They might, however, quite readily change places (may have already in some parts of the world), so that a left arm stuck straight out a left window signalled an intention to turn right and one stuck straight up signalled an intention to turn left: it would make no difference from the perspective of communication, for the meaning is in the code, and the new code could be as readily mastered as the old. Signs, in other words, are the creatures of codes with the loss of which they are rendered — like fat — into their constituent components, disembodied signifieds separated from insignificant signifiers. It is the codification in which the sign adheres, nothing else. Or, as Umberto Eco puts it:

A sign is always an element of an expression plane conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane. Every time there is a correlation of this kind, recognized by a human society, there is a sign. Only in this sense is it possible to accept Saussure’s definition according to which a sign is the correspondence between a signifier and a signified. This assumption entails some consequences: a a sign is not a physical entity, the physical entity being at most the concrete occurrence of the expressive pertinent element; b a sign is not a fixed semiotic entity but rather the meeting ground for independent elements (coming from two different systems of two different planes and meeting on the basis of a coding correlation).  

Because signs neither have physical existence (unlike the signifier) nor permanence, they are frequently referred to as sign-functions, or in Eco’s words:
Properly speaking there are not signs, but only sign-functions ... A sign-function is realized when two functives (expression and content) enter into a mutual correlation; the same functive can also enter into another correlation, thus becoming a different functive and therefore giving rise to a new sign-function. Thus signs are the provisional result of coding rules which establish transitory correlations of elements, each of these elements being entitled to enter — under given coded circumstances — into another correlation and thus form a new sign.12

This is not a game of words. The vocabulary is not important (not to us). What is important is the notion that signs — or sign-functions or symbols: what they are called does not matter — that signs, to repeat, are realized only when coding rules bring into correlation two elements or items (or functives) from two domains or systems (the one signifying, of expression; the other signified, of content); and that whenever there is such a correlation, there is a sign. You may call this resulting sign an icon. You may call it a pictogram. You may call it a word. You may call it an index. You may call it a symbol. You may call it a piece of sculpture. You may call it a sentence. You may call it a map. You may call it New York City. In every case, whatever else it is, it is, in its sign function, also a sign, that is, a creature of a code.

No signs without codes. It must be insisted upon. That is, no self-explanatory signs. No signs which so resemble their referents as to self-evidently refer to them. They are inevitably arbitrary (inevitably reveal a value). Writing about the way Saussure and Peirce occasionally came to similar conclusions from different assumptions, Jonathan Culler says:

Saussure, taking the linguistic sign as the norm, argues that all signs are arbitrary, involving a purely conventional association of conventionally delimited signifiers and signifieds; and he extends this principle to domains such as etiquette, arguing that however natural or motivated signs may seem to those who use them, they are always determined by social rule, semiotic convention. Peirce, on the contrary, begins with a distinction between arbitrary signs, which he calls 'symbols,' and two sorts of motivated signs, indices and icons, but in his work on the latter he reaches a conclusion similar to Saussure's. Whether we are dealing with maps, paintings, or diagrams, "every material image is largely conventional in its mode of representation." We can only claim that a map actually resembles what it represents if we take for granted and pass over in silence numerous complicated conventions. Icons seem to be based on natural resemblance, but in fact they are determined by semiotic convention.13

Once the superordinate role of the convention (the rule, the code) is accepted it becomes easy to explain how what 'self-evidently' resembles a river on a map equally 'self-evidently' resembles veins on a diagram of the circulatory system, without invoking complicated principles of metaphor (not that these might not have been operant in the genesis of the sign). It is not that the reader thinks, "Oh, yes, the deoxygenated blood is relatively bluer than that in the arteries, and under a clear blue sky the surface of rivers often seems blue; and both veins and arteries carry [whatever 'carry' means] liquids in a branching [see 'tree'] network [see 'net,' see 'weaving'], sooo, let's see, that means ..." This is not how it happens at all. What happens is that the reader finds himself in an entirely distinct coded circumstance.
all at once. At the level of language the diagram of the circulatory system is decoded without reference to the codes of the map, and vice versa. There is certainly no question of resemblance with respect to which Barthes notes that it would be in any case a resemblance to an identity (the identity of the river, the identity of the vein), an identity “imprecise, even imaginary, to the point where I can continue to speak of ‘likeness’ without ever having seen the model.”14 as those do who justify this sign for veins because ‘they look like veins’ without ever having seen a vein (without having seen a hepatic vein, without having seen an inferior vena cava), or the sign for a river (the Colorado) because ‘it looks like a river’ (the Thames? the Cuyahoga?) without having seen it (without having seen where the Colorado trickles all but dry into the Gulf of California). It is not a matter of resemblance: the blue line is a blue line. It is the code that does the work, not the signifier. If there is involved an iconicism it is always at the level of the structure of the system (it is analogic not metaphoric). It is less the blueness of deoxygenation that says ‘veins’ than the simultaneous redness of the arteries, their characteristic jointure at the extremities, and their perfect parallelism; it is less the blue-between-black lines that says ‘river’ than its characteristic form, its characteristic relationship to other forms (other rivers, mountains, roads, towns and oceans); so that ‘veins’ can as easily be read in black or gray, and ‘rivers’ in diagrams of drainage basins and maps of flood insurance purchase. To say that it is the code that does the work, not the signifier, is just another way of saying that it is the code that makes the sign, not the mark.

So it is the codes upon which one must fasten if the map is to be decoded (or if a map is to be encoded). We think it possible to distinguish ten of these (there are doubtless others), which either the map exploits, or by virtue of which the map is exploited. Neither class is independent of the other, and no map fails to be inscribed in (at least) these ten codes. Those which the map exploits we term codes of intrasignification. These operate, so to speak, within the map: at the level of language. Those by virtue of which the map is exploited we term codes of extrasignification. These operate, so to speak, outside the map: at the level of myth.

Among the codes of intrasignification five at least are inescapable, the iconic, the linguistic, the tectonic, the temporal and the presentational. Under the heading iconic we subsume the code of ‘things’ (‘events’), with whose relative location the map is enrapt: the streets of Genoa, rates of death by cancer, exports of French wine, the losses suffered in Napoleon’s Russian campaign, airways, subways, the buildings of Manhattan, levels of air pollutants over six counties in Southern California, the rivers, roads, counties, airports, cities and towns of North Carolina. The iconic is the code of the inventory, of the world’s fragmentation: into urban hierarchies, into hypsometric layers, into wet and dry. The linguistic is the code of the names: the Via Corsica, the Corso Aurelio Saffi; trachea, bronchus and lung cancer, white males, age-adjusted rate by county, 1950–1969; France, Amérique du Nord; Moscou, Polotzk; DME chan 82 St John vsj 113.5; Cortland St World Tr Ctr RR PATH; the Graybar Building, the Seagram; Orange County, Reactive Hydrocarbons; Cape Fear River, us 421, Pasquotank, Cherry Pt., Winston-Salem, Hickory. The linguistic is the code of classification, of ownership: identifying, naming, assigning. The relationships of these things in space is given in the tectonic codes: in the scalar – in the number of miles (or feet) encoded in every inch –, and in the
**topological** – in the planimetry of cities, the stereometry of mountain ranges, the projective geometry of continents, the topographometry of the field traverse, the simple topology of the sketch map giving directions to the cocktail party. The tectonic is the code of finding, it is the code of getting there: it is the code of getting. Because there is no connection, no communication, except in time, the codes of filiation are **temporal**, codes of duration, codes of tense. The **durative** establishes the scale, the map’s *durée*, its ‘thickness’: as the map of rates of death from cancer, 1950–1969, is ‘thicker’ than the 1978–79 North Carolina highway map, which is ‘thicker’ than the map of reactive hydrocarbons, 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., July 22, 1979. The durative reveals (or hides or is mute about) lapses in cosynchronicity. The **tense** says when: some maps are in the past tense (‘The World of Alexander the Great’), others in the future tense (‘Tomorrow’s Highways’), but most maps plump for the present (‘State of the World Today’), or, if they can possibly get away with it, the aorist: no duration at all (no thickness), out of chronology (not lost – just out of it): free of time. These attain to myth at the very level of language. Each of these codes — iconic, linguistic, tectonic and temporal — is embodied in signs with all the physicality of the concrete instantiation of the expressive pertinent element. On the page, on the sheet of paper, on the illuminated display with its flashing lights, these concrete instantiations are ordered, arranged, organized by the **presentational** code: they are presented. Title, legend box, map image, text, illustrations, inset map images, scale, instructions, charts, apologies, diagrams, photos, explanations, arrows, decorations, color scheme, type faces are all chosen, layered, structured to achieve speech: coherent, articulate discourse. It is a question of the architecture of the picture plane, what’s in the center and what’s at the edge, what’s in fluorescent pink and what’s in the blue of Williamsburg, whether the paper crackles with (apparent) age or sluffs off repeated foldings like a rubber sheet, whether the map image predominates or the text takes over. It is never, even at the lowest level, a question merely of escaping the stigmas of paranomia and aphrasia, dysphemia and idiolalia, dyslogia and cacology. From the very beginning it is a matter of fluency and eloquence, and soon enough of vigor and force of expression, of rhetoric, of polemic, for wherever it may begin, the code of presentation soon enough carries the map out of the domain of intrasignification into that of **extrasignification**, into that of the culture that insists upon its existence, that nurture it, that consumes it.

Among the codes of extrasignification five again are inescapable, the **thematic**, the **topic**, the **historical**, the **rhetorical**, and the **utilitarian**. All operate at the level of myth, all make off with the map for their own purposes (as they made the map), all distort its meaning (its meaning at the level of language), subvert it to their own. If the presentational code permits the map to achieve a level of discourse, the **thematic** code establishes its subject: on what shall the map discourse? What shall it argue? Though it is precisely the thematic code that has dictated their appearance on the map, from the perspective of the reader the theme is experienced as a latency inherent in the ‘things’ iconically encoded in the map: roads, for instance, it is a map of roads and highways, it asserts the significance of roads and highways (if only by picturing them, if only by foregrounding them), its theme is Automobility (the legitimacy of Automobility). Or it is a general reference map, a map of
hydrography and relief carved into political units and plastered with railroads and towns, a map, that is, of a landscape smothered by humanity, tamed, subdued (the red railroads—sometimes black—invariably reminiscent of the bonds by means of which the Lilliputians restrained Gulliver), its theme is Nature Subdued. And precisely as the thematic code runs off with the icons, so the topic code (with a long \( o \) from topos, place, as in topography, not topicality) runs off with the space established by the tectonic code, turns it from space to place, bounds it (binds it), gives it a name, sets it off from other space, asserts its existence: this place is. Ditto the historical code. Only it works on the time established in the map by the temporal code. Are there bounding dates to the map’s durée? Then the historical code appropriates them to an era, assigns it a name, incorporates it in a vision of history.

So an archeological map of Central America acquires the title, ‘Before 1500 / Pre-Columbian Glory,’ one of 19th century plantation crops, political units, selected urban places, cart roads, railroads and battles the title, ‘1821–1900 / Time of Independence,’ yet another of similar subjects (though with the addition of a sign for refugee centers) the caption, ‘1945–Present / Upheaval and Uncertainty.’

There is no time that cannot be reduced to these sequacious causal schemata, absorbed into these platitudes, made comfortable and safe because grasped, understood. If the thematic code sets the subject for the discourse, if the topic and historical codes secure the place and time, it is the rhetorical code that sets the tone, that, having consumed the presentational code, most completely orients the map in its culture (in its set of values), pointing in the very act of pointing somewhere else (to the globe) to itself, to its maker, to the culture that produced it, to the place and time and omphalos of that culture—the more dramatically as the aspect of the globe toward which it points is alien, is exotic, i.e., can have its title set in a type that mimics bamboo (Figure 6). It is a code of jingoisms, a code that beats its chest like Tarzan, a code of the sort of subtle chauvinisms that encourages the National Geographic to call a road a ‘road’ on its map of the Central Plains, 1803–1845, but to call it a ‘cart road’ on its map of Central America, 1821–1900. But, after all, it is an ‘American’ map, that is, a map that reflects the genius of the North Americans, or at least those north of the Rio Grande (for according to the National Geographic the ancient Maya had but ‘trade routes’ and even the Camino Real is just a ‘trail’); and, if only because it is the mapping culture, the mapping culture stands at stage center, with all the others in the wings. For the rhetorical code the mere existence of the map is a sign of its higher culture, its sophistication: it is rhetorical au fond, and for this reason no map can eschew it. It is like clothing: even not to wear it is to be caught in the net of meanings woven by the code of fashion. To attempt to shed the rhetorical code is but to shout the more stridently through it: it is the very disregard for the subtler aspects of the code of presentation that so completely characterizes the publisher of The Nuclear War Atlas as ‘socially conscious’; it is nothing other than their violations of good taste that allow us to read the editors of The State of the World Atlas as angry.
rhetoric (Brooks Brothers’ shirts, clean classic clothing). The rigorous dispassion of a topographic survey sheet is seductive precisely in the degree to which no sign of seduction is apparent: the message of Nature Subdued is the more powerful because it seems to be spoken not by the map (it appears to say nothing, appears to allow the world to speak) but by Nature itself. Here the map dresses itself in the style of Science. Elsewhere it will dress in the style of Art. Or in the style of the Advertisement. Or in the Vernacular (the North Carolina Highway map). The rhetorical code appropriates to its map the style most advantageous to the myth it intends to propagate. None is untouchable. All have been used. As the map itself is finally used, picked up bodily by the utilitarian code to be carted off for any purpose myth might serve. A professor of curriculum and instruction, commenting on the availability of state highway maps for secondary classroom use, remarks, “It has the governor’s picture on it. You can get as many as you want.” It is here that the academic model of the map with its scanning eyes and graduated circle-comparing minds breaks down most completely. It has no room for the real uses of most maps which are to possess and to claim, to legitimate and to name. Which great king, which emperor, which great republic has failed to signal its coming of age by the mapping of its domains? Whatever the pragmatic considerations (they are, after all, maps that speak also at the level of language), it has
inevitably also been an act of conspicuous consumption, a sign of contemporaneity as well as wealth and power, a symbolic manifestation of the rights of possession. *These* are the uses of maps as certainly as it is the most important function of maps in geographic journals to certify the geographic legitimacy of the articles they decorate. The anthropology of cartography is an urgent project: what *are* all those maps actually used for? Signs, badges, tokens, emblems, billboards, gestures, leases, deeds, wallpaper, pretty picture: and do not say *not this one* — not a topographic survey sheet —, for as surely as you do it will turn out to be that one with the most heinous agenda. Or that may be putting it too strongly. And yet this is how A.S. Hewitt, the man who in 1879 wrote the Geological Survey’s enabling legislation, puts it in the epigram to the Survey’s centennial history: “What is there in *this richly endowed land of ours which may be dug, or gathered, or harvested*, and made part of the wealth of America and of the world, and how and where does it lie?” \(^9\) Whatever else this might be, it is not a language of disinterested curiosity, it is a language of exploitation. Dressed in their button-down white shirts and suitable ties it is the language spoken by the survey sheets as well, in their metered regularity (so many sheets per unit area), in their sensible no-nonsense layout, in their methodical tiling, their obsessive coverage. “To catalogue,” Barthes notes, “is not merely to ascertain, as it appears at first glance, but also to appropriate.” \(^20\) How are survey sheets different from maps of military targets?

**INTRASIGNIFICATION**

Clearly, the map is comprehended in two ways (Figure 7). As a medium of language (in the broadest sense) it serves as a visual analogue of phenomena, attributes, and spatial relations: a model on which we may act, in lieu or anticipation of experience, to compare or contrast, mensurate or appraise, analyze or predict. It seems to inform, with unimpeachable dispassion, of the objects and events of the world. As myth, however, it refers to itself and to its makers, and to a world seen quite subjectively through their eyes. It trades in values and ambitions; it is politicized. Signing functions that serve the former set of purposes we have termed intrasignificant; those which serve the latter, extrasignificant. Whereas intrasignification consists of an array of sign functions indigenous to the map and which, taken jointly, constitute the map as *sign*, extrasignification appropriates the complete map and deploys it as *expression* in a broader semiotic context. The map acts as a focusing device between these two planes of signification, as a lens that gathers up its internal or constituent signs and offers them up collectively as *a map*. But what offers from the map is not substantially different from what is afferent upon it — these have simply been repositioned in the semiological function — and, while extrasignification exploits the map in its entirety, we have seen how the initiatives of myth extend to even the most fundamental and apparently sovereign aspects of intrasignification, and are ultimately rooted in them. These aspects require our further attention.

The map is the product of a spectrum of codes that materialize its visual representations, orient it in space and in time, and bind it together in some acceptable form. The actions of these codes are, if not entirely independent,
reasonably distinct. *Iconic codes* govern the manner in which graphic expressions correspond with geographic items, concrete or abstract, and their attendant attributes. A *linguistic code* (occasionally two or several) is extended to the map to regulate the equivalence of typographic expressions and, via the norms of written language, a universe of terminology and nomenclature. As the space of the map is configured by *tectonic codes* — transformational procedures prescribing its topological and scalar relations to the space of the globe —, *temporal codes* configure the time of the map in relation to the stream of events and observations from which it derives. The diversity of expressions that constitute the map are organized and orchestrated through a *presentational code* that fuses them into a coherent cartographic discourse.

**Iconic Codes**

*Iconicity is the indispensable quality of the map. It is the source and principle of the map’s analogy to objects, places, relations, and events. In its capacity as geographic icon, the map subsumes a remarkable variety of visual representations and the codes, both general and specific, that underwrite them; yet the degree of iconicity evident in the map as a whole is not uniformly echoed among its con-
The dot that represents a town is not iconic in the same way as the intricately shaped area representing a city; the blue line representing a river is not iconic in the same sense as the blue line representing a county road or, for that matter, a shoreline. Pursued far enough, every icon is seen as the product of two procedures: a symbolic (substitutive) operation that provides the basis of its representative potential, and a scheme of arrangement that yields its specific and individual form. The balance struck between these has frequently been the canon by which we judge representations as symbolic (of the town, for example) or iconic (of the city); and while this distinction will not be abandoned here, it will be applied with extreme care. No symbol is totally arbitrary unless it can be stripped entirely of connotation (an unlikely and undesirable prospect) and no icon is motivated free of convention because representation without convention is not possible. We can only say that some representations are more explicitly iconic or symbolic in function; and that media of cultural exchange — maps in particular — serve as proving grounds where iconic representations gradually acquire symbolic status through a process of reiteration and cultural distension.

The iconicity of Hermann Bollmann’s ‘New York Picture Map’ is so powerful that its representational conventions virtually disappear from view (Figure 8). On inspection, the picture plane melts away and our attention falls into a landscape of tangible urban forms: streets, sidewalks, roofs, facades, doors, windows.
It seems so literal, so transparent to interpretation, so natural that it is difficult to accept as a highly conventionalized and essentially symbolic representation. Yet without our conventions of pictorial rendering this arresting image would be opaque and meaningless. Make no mistake. Iconicity, as Bhattacharya has explained, is the product of a spatial transcription; and its derived form is an arrangement of marks in relation to one another and to the space they occupy. The icon is motivated not by a monolithic precedent form but by the formal and necessarily spatial arrangement it would transcribe on the page, and it can only materialize through a transcriptive procedure. This procedure, in Bollmann's map, turns out to be extraordinarily elaborate: involving 67,000 photographs taken with specially-designed cameras, an axonometric projection spread in two dimensions by a calculated widening of streets, and, according to the map's jacket, "several unique devices which remain his secret." It emerges from a tradition of representation that is distinctly Western and intensively codified, and it speaks through a familiar (to us) regime of symbolic principles: lines demark intersections of planes and boundaries between solid and void; certain organizations of lines denote rectilinear volumes; recurring tonal patterns denote illuminated forms. To describe iconicity as a simple matter of visual likeness (as if this could be a simple matter), or as a formal correspondence between expression and referent, is to mystify its explanation and divorce it entirely from cultural enterprise. Iconicity derives from our ability to transcribe arrangements in space and mark them out in conventional symbols — in other words, to map them. This ability is as fully realized in the drawing by da Vinci as in the Swiss topographic map, where the natural landscape — like Bollmann's urban landscape  — is portrayed as a complex and continuous icon, bathed in light and rendered with the consummate authority of an iconism as richly meaningful for its audience as for its maker (Figure 9).

The map of population distribution produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Census has some of this same pretense. Substitute night for day, luminosity for reflectivity, and city form for architectural or geomorphic form, and we have an equally credible — if more remotely viewed — icon of human settlement. But the symbolism of this map is more explicit, and less uniform; in fact it embraces several distinctly different representative principles. Urbanized areas, like Bollmann's office towers and Imhof's mountains, enter the map as geographic icons, shaped by the space of the features themselves transcribed onto the graphic plane. Isolated cities and towns, however, enter as geometrically pure squares and circles regardless of their geographic shape; they have undergone an abstraction conventionalizing their form and enacting their status as symbols. Beyond and between these, symbols are disengaged from exact spatial correspondence and referred to features which are in themselves abstractions. In the first instance, form is given as the consequence of the feature's spatial extension and the topological transformation that implants it on the page. Symbolism remains characteristic: white is city, dark blue is water (or foreign terrain), black is neither. In the second instance a formal symbolism is activated: white square is city or white circle is city. In the third instance, symbols are fixed not only in form but in value as well, and they acquire a limited but necessary mobility within a scheme that treats them not as localized occurrences (in which case they have no literal meaning) but
FIGURE 9. From a lexicon of graphic symbols, a geographic icon. While significant in itself, each mark, like a point of color in a Seurat painting, is subservient to the impression of the whole. (From ‘Maps for America’ by Morris M. Thompson, published by the U.S. Department of the Interior, 1979.)
as elements of a comprehensive system to be interpreted *en masse*. This map is truly a *tour de force*, an exemplar of cartographic representation deploying an arsenal of significant strategies from the most abstract and conventionalized to the most geographically constrained and overtly iconic. While we might expect, from this description, a baffling and practically indecipherable stew of signs, what we have instead is a remarkably legible and coherent representation, one which correlates strongly with a photographic representation of the same phenomena. Profound differences of symbolic principle merge, almost seamlessly, in an icon that eschews the formal consequences of their application and takes their distribution as the basis of its own.

Signs formed, rather than just characterized, independently of geographic space are free to engage in formal metaphor. A lighthouse is signed with an ornamented triangle or an outlined circle and a complement of rays, a mine with an occluded dot or an emblematically crossed pick and shovel. Extracted from map context, these signs are icons in their own right—but icons of what? The triangular lighthouse sign and the circular mine sign are ostensible abstractions of their phenomenal counterparts and, regardless of their degree of abstraction, they remain icons insofar as they maintain a structural correspondence with them. But the circle and rays sign is iconic only in respect to the light, not the lighthouse, and it represents by virtue of a part-for-whole substitution. The pick and shovel sign (with no regard for technological currency) represents mining rather than mine by substituting artifact for process. These last two examples are conventional metaphors, parallels to which abound in maps. They differ from the icons of urban form and symbols of city size in not referring literally to the phenomena they represent. They anticipate interpretation by singling out connotations and presenting them as surrogate icons. Icon is proffered, and taken, as symbol.

In signs which are geographically conformal, metaphor operates through characteristic. Green symbolizes trees, and blue water, in our maps with the same conviction they did in the childhood drawings that emplaced these metaphors in our vocabulary. Never mind drought, Autumn, and acid rain, and never mind the cubic miles of eroded silt that choke our rivers. In the map, our forests glow with the robust verdure of a perpetual Spring afternoon and even the Mississippi shines with a pristine Caribbean blue. These metaphors proclaim the map as ideal, or at least hyperbole: at once an analogue of our environment and an avenue for cultural fantasy about it. False coloration is hardly restricted to remotely-sensed imagery; it is characteristic of all our maps, which it dresses in the most reassuring tones.

The iconic code of the map is a complex mix of more specific codes—potentially any established or even *ad hoc* code of graphic representation, provided it either is or can be conventionalized. The map seems to have assimilated the entire history of visual communication, maintaining an immense pool of representational techniques and methodologies from which it draws freely, with little preference or prejudice, and which it augments through continual invention and recombination. While this inventory is far too extensive to be catalogued here, we can summarize the object of its application. The map is an icon, a visual analogue of a geographic landscape. It is the product of a number of deliberate, repetitive, symbolic gestures, carefully arranged and explicitly or implicitly re-
ferred to elements of a content taxonomy. Formal items — the discrete elements of iconic coding — may be shaped within the space of the map, in which case their symbolism and metaphorical potentials are characteristic, or preformed and imposed on the map, activating formal symbolism and formal metaphor as well. The diversity of cartographic expression far surpasses that of written language or any other medium of practical exchange; but map signs are only as diverse as our abilities to interpret them and their formation is as firmly prescribed by the confines of our own visual culture, the array of conventions that dictate how we may equate marks and meanings. The iconic code of the map is the sum of its various conventions of graphic representation; the comprehensive icon of map image is the synthesis of their actions.

**Linguistic Codes**

It is difficult to imagine a map without language. However separate the evolution of iconic and linguistic representation, the map has, for millennia, embraced both. External to the map image, language assumes its familiar textual forms: identifying, explaining, elaborating, crediting, cautioning. Its main role, though, lies within the map image and in its interpretive template, the map legend. Like graphic marks, typographic marks sign the content of the map, on different yet complementary grounds.

In the legend, semantic connections are made between classes of graphic images or image attributes and linguistic representations on the phenomena to which they refer. In this capacity, the legend acts as interpreter between the unique semiological system of individual map and the culturally universal system of language; so that on seeing a red circle, for example, we may hear the words ‘Welcome Center’ (even if we’re not entirely sure what that means). If it is legitimate to say that maps are read, then they are read in this respect. In translating graphic expression to linguistic expression we make the map literate, and its meanings subject to literary representation and manipulation. It seems our compulsion and need to do so.

Within the map image, linguistic signs address not only what things are called (‘Lake’) but also what they are named (‘Superior’). Thus identification is a matter of both designation and nomenclature. Much of our geographic nomenclature carries a residuum of designation, as in ‘Union City’, ‘Youngstown’, ‘Louisville’, ‘Pittsburgh’; but with respect to natural features it is practically obligatory. One word, ‘river’ for instance, may occur hundreds of times within a single map image. The cartographer who would erase this redundancy, however, finds that rivers are no longer distinguishable from creeks, nor lakes from reservoirs. Here language is not just naming features, but illuminating content distinctions which have, for whatever reason, escaped iconic coding.

If the function of language in maps were simply toponymic, we could assume that the linguistic signifiers themselves, if recognizably formed and correctly arranged, would be fixed in meaning. This is clearly not the case. Within the map image, elements of visible language serve as counterparts to iconic signs, overlapping their content and spatial domains and echoing their iconic properties. In the map image, entire words and arrangements of words are given iconic license,
FIGURE 10. A field of linguistic map signs. Even without internal distinctions of color, its iconicity is immediately apparent in contrast to the surrounding text. (From artwork by Gerald Boulet for 'Midwestern Ontario/Outdoor Recreation,' published by the Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 1982.

generating a field of linguistic signs best likened to concrete poetry. Letters expand in size, increase in weight, or assume majuscule form to denote higher degrees of importance. Stylistic, geometric, and chromatic variations signal broad semantic divisions. Textual syntax is largely abandoned as words are stretched and contorted and word groups rearranged to fit the space of their iconic equivalents. Clearly this code invokes more than the disposition of phonetic archetypes²⁸ (Figure 10).

It’s not that the map rejects the groundrules of textualized language; if it did, it would quickly degenerate to a vehicle for newspeak or nonsense. Even seem-
ingly absurd statements like 'Lac Champlain Lake' and 'Rio Grande River' are grammatically functional in a bilingual or multilingual culture. What this code gains in the cartographic context is nearly unrestricted access to the means of iconic coding. Among attempts to produce maps entirely from linguistic signs, the more successful have been cognizant of these means; and in even the most familiar maps the field of topographic signs, taken on its own, visualizes the geographic landscape in much the same way as the field of graphic signs. The map is simultaneously language and image. As word lends icon access to the semantic field of its culture, icon invites word to realize its expressive potentials in the visual field. The result is the dual signification virtually synonymous with maps, and the complementary exchange of meaning that it engenders. The map image provides a context in which the semantics of the linguistic code are extended to embrace a variety of latent iconic potentials; to the same end, it imposes a secondary syntax which shapes entire linguistic signifiers into local icons.

**Tectonic Codes**

Before approaching this subject, we should refresh our understanding of codes. A code is an interpretive framework, a set of conventions or rules, which permits the equivalence of expression (a graphic or typographic mark) and content (forest, population of less than 1,000 persons, or multilane limited-access highway). In effect, a code legislates how something may be construed as signifying, as representing, something else. In this respect signs are encoded in formation and decoded in interpretation; and it is only through the mediation of a code that signification is possible.

Each map employs a tectonic code, a code of construction, which configures graphic space in a particular relation to geodesic space. This code effects a topological transformation from spheroid to plane in sign production and plane to spheroid in interpretation. It has a scalar function as well, logically separable from the topological but not practically independent of it. While the role of this code as representative principle is evident, its content and expression are less so, because both of these functives are abstract space. The tectonic code governs a sign function which has as its content a topology and as the product of its action a correlative topology. If cartographic projections and scales have not been widely recognized as codes, it is not because they are difficult to formulate (reducible to concise mathematical expressions they are much more easily formulated than the codes of iconic and linguistic representation) but because they do not in themselves produce material imagery. They offer space for space, abstraction for abstraction, and their work is not visible until it is subjected to iconic coding. The mesh of graticule lines cradling the map image is not the tectonic code itself, but an icon of the topology acted upon by this code. Nor is it obligatory to render this topology: frequently it is manifest only in the shape and disposition of features and, when it is visualized, it serves primarily as a referencing system to implement the literalization or numeralization of space (Figure 11).

This code traffics in spatial meanings, and the messages it allows us to extract from the map are messages of distance, direction, and extent. It shapes and scales the graphic plane in such a way that these messages emerge, veridically or
FIGURE 11. Icons of geodesic space, transcribed through a variety of tectonic codes. While scale and viewpoint maintain a general constancy, extreme regional distortions arise as the consequence of topological transformation. The cartographer's choice is not based on a chimerical concept of objectivity, but on the degree to which these distortions support the underlying proposition of the map. (From 'Semiology of Graphics' by Jacques Bertin, translated by William J. Berg, published by the University of Wisconsin Press, copyright © 1983 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.)

erroneously, from the map image. While iconic and linguistic codes access the semantic field of geographic knowledge, the tectonic code provides their syntactical superstructure; this is the code through which we signify not what, but where. In moulding the map image, the tectonic code allows it to refer to the space which we occupy and experience; and inevitably it is laden with our preconceptions about that space. It is hardly surprising to find the map projection at the center of political controversy, pretending as it does to validate our cultural centrisms and objectify our territorial aims. It has these potentials because it allows us to view the world as we choose — as much or as little of it as we like, from whatever vantage point we like, and with whatever distortions we like — and, even though we know
better, it projects an aura of ubiquity and authenticity. It can do so because we recognize it as the only thing exact — if in the most limited sense — in a practice that propagandizes exactitude as if this were the reason for its existence.

Temporal Codes

'Every map is out-of-date before it's printed.' This adage is a staple of the cartographic office. It is customarily dragged out for the benefit of the novice, held up as a fact of life (like death or taxes), and then put aside as an inevitable consequence of the complexities of the mapping process. If it is ever meant seriously, then that's as a barb at the sluggishness of the mapping bureaucracy — every member of the bureaucracy except, of course, the cartographer. But for the most part it evokes laughter or sentient smiles rather than angst (let's not get too wound up over it; we said out-of-date, not obsolete), and it's really not the sort of thing that cartographers lose sleep over. It just makes them a little uneasy.

Somehow we've gotten the idea that maps have nothing to do with time. We'll indicate a date of publication, and perhaps a timeframe for data collection, but that's about as far as it goes — and these gestures have more to do with the status of the map as a document than with any issue of map time. We shrug that one off, if a bit nervously, because we've learned to make maps in the terms they can resolve. Anything that changes fast enough to render the map genuinely obsolete before it can reach its audience doesn't belong in the map in the first place. The map is opaque to these things; it filters them out. That's partly a function of scale: maps are macroscalar and macroscopic and, after all, we are mapping mountains and not the pebbles inching down their slopes. But the things we're increasingly interested in mapping don't have this short-term permanence at any scale; they're more in the nature of behaviors than geographic fixtures. These interests may inspire new map forms, but they haven't forced us yet to admit that maps embody time as surely as — in fact because — they embody space. Most of us continue to think of the map as either a snapshot — in time but not of it; something with time evaporated out of it — or as akin to a three-hour exposure of Grand Central Station, in which actions, events, and processes disappear and all that register are objects of permanence. We may be acutely aware of emplacing time in the photograph, and even of permanence as the arbitrary consequence of this act, but we don't generally extend these understandings to the map. There time retains the character of a hidden dimension, a cartographic Twilight Zone. But the map does encode time, and to the same degree that it encodes space, and it invokes a temporal code that empowers it to signify in the temporal dimension. That the action of this code on temporal attributes should be explained by the action of two sub-codes which parallel those acting on spatial attributes is hardly surprising. The map employs a code of tense, concerning its temporal topology, and a code of duration, which concerns its temporal scale.

Tense is the direction in which the map points, the direction of its reference in time. It refers to past, to present (or a past so immediate as to be taken as present), or future — relative, of course, to its own temporal position. So we have maps in the past tense ('East Asia at the time of the Ch'ing Dynasty'), maps in the present tense (the '1986-1987 North Carolina Transportation Map'), and maps in the future tense (of tomorrow's weather, or a simulation of nuclear winter). We also have
temporal postures, like that of the fantastic map (of 'Middle Earth', 'Dune', or 'Slobbivia') that has a present and past separate — but not entirely detached — from our own, or the allegorical map ('The Map of Matrimony', 'The Gospel Temperance Railroad Map', 'The Road to Hell')

that proclaims itself atemporal or eternal and, in doing so, makes a stance of tense that more closely resembles the aorist of Greek than any English form. As maps slide into the past they become past maps ('antique' is a term reserved for past maps of some virtue or special appeal) where they continue to refer to their pasts, presents, and imagined futures. The posture of the facsimile and the counterfeit is one of position rather than reference, the facsimile admitting (if only in a whisper) of its true temporal position.

The distinction between present and past is always difficult. A map positioned in the last century is obviously past — or is it? The physiographic map of 1886 is past by virtue of its cultural references — its references to the state of physiographic knowledge or the state of graphic representation in 1886 — not by virtue of its content, which we still insist we can scale into immutability. Erwin Raisz's physiographic maps, interleaved among the pages of the modern atlas, appear trans­ported there from another time — and they are — but we take them all the same as maps of the present. Without a more stable yardstick, the passage of cartographic time is marked off in editions. For the atlas it is accelerated by political and developmental pace and braked by the constraints of map production; for the topographic map it's modulated by the intensity of localized activity; and with the digital database it's fixed in a perpetual virtual present.

Meanwhile, the current incarnation of the USGS quadrangle sheet expresses temporal distance, the distance between the present map and its predecessor, with a violent purple denoting these things as having happened between then (whenever then was) and now. Cher­ished globes have been sacrificed to garage sales and flea markets, the megabuck atlas is becoming an art investment, and we even have a class of disposable maps (with a lifespan roughly equal to that of a newspaper) characterized not so much by its funk as its anticipated, and almost immediate, obsolescence. We are increas­ingly conscious of the distance between present tense and past tense; and while it's still remarkably elastic, it is — as everyone tells us — shrinking fast.

The durative code of the map operates on the scalar aspect of time. As spatial scale is a relation between the space of the map and the space of the world, temporal scale is a relation between the time of the map and the time of the world. To understand this, we have to see the map as having thickness in time. Take for example an electronic map of traffic density in downtown Raleigh. Let's say that, in one minute, it plays out on a color graphics terminal the events of an entire day. This map has a temporal scale that is the ratio of one interval (a minute) to another (twenty-four hours), or 1:1440. It compresses time in the same manner that it compresses space. Of course, that was a convenient example. Consider instead the newcomer to Raleigh mapping out his environment from a bus window. It's Saturday afternoon and he's just boarded the South Saunders bus at the central transfer point on Martin Street.
Mall. In one direction the Mall slides down to the glassed and steel-trussed Convention Center. At the other end, three blocks away, the turquoise dome of the State Capital bulges over its massive oaks. The view in both directions is fragmented by the Mall’s decor: saplings, floral planters, a scattering of sculptures, a clock mounted on a mirrored kiosk. There are seven other passengers on the bus now, one of them thrusting his hand relentlessly into a box of candied popcorn. The next seat bears five knife slits, and here and there a nom de plume stands out in the faded graffiti: ‘Catbird’, ‘The Non Stop Crew’, ‘Woogie Tee.’

4:55 The bus rolls from the curb, stops abruptly as another nudges in front of it, then groans away. The street is compressed by grey and beige walls rising a half dozen stories from the sidewalk. At eye level the bus reflects dimly in the plate glass of old shop fronts. Everything is in shadow.

4:57 A right turn onto Blount Street. To the left, aging warehouses catch the sunlight head on. One of them announces its renovation. The next block’s been levelled on both sides and, to the right, a sea of asphalt and windshields foregrounds the city’s nucleus of office towers. Several blocks of shotgun shacks, verandas crowded with laundry lines and painted metal chairs, then the expanse of South Street slashed clear around Memorial Auditorium, an imposing chunk of institutionalized Art Deco.

4:59 The bus dips beneath the Shaw University pedestrian bridge, careens right onto Smithfield, and stops beside a tiny parkette of juniper. Here Wilmington and Salisbury streets merge into Highway 50 and zip off in six grass-trimmed lanes of new pavement toward the Garner suburbs. As cars burst past in both directions, the driver weighs his odds...

5:01 Past the commuters’ raceway, the bus rattles over a set of railway tracks and the backside of Memorial Auditorium jumps across the right windows. Swinging left onto old Fayetteville Street, it stops below a cascade of terraces capped by an archetypal red brick elementary school. Directly across the street, a project sprawls out sheathed with brown wood siding and decorated in spray-bomb cursive. One person leaves the bus and two teenage girls hoist a stroller through the front doors.

5:03 To the right a fresh canopy of leaves spreads over the weathered monuments of Mount Hope Cemetery, and to the left the project gives way to squared-off little homes. The bus wheels right onto Maywood and the small homes persevere, gradually brightening. On the neighborhood basketball court, a girl in a pink jumpsuit buries a fifteen-footer.

5:06 The bus lurches across a graded swath of red soil that imprints the future widening of South Saunders Street, and brakes to a halt opposite Earp’s Seafood. It turns right onto South Saunders, then left at Carroll’s Used Tires, then right again onto Fuller. A stretch of tidy compact houses ends suddenly at Lake Wheeler Road. A tire swing (one of Carroll’s?) hangs outside the near window. Several passengers disembark here; one boards and is recognized. “How ya doin’?” “Awright!”

5:08 The bus cuts right onto Lake Wheeler Road and descends a long grade. To the left a high chain link fence tracks its descent, staking out the boundary of Dorothea Dix Hospital. To the right a precipitous slope tumbles into a clutter of rooftops and ahead Raleigh’s best downtown panorama spreads over the windshield. At the foot of the grade, the road dovetails back into South Saunders where a column of plaster hens files across the eaves of R.B.’s Chicken’n’ Ribs.
5:11 Passing the entrance to the Dorothea Dix grounds, the bus stops in front of Heritage Park (another housing project but far more ambitious than the one on Fayetteville Street). Three riders step out cradling their afternoon purchases, and a right turn onto South Street aims just off the downtown core. Another descent, bottoming out below a closely set pair of railway trestles, then a quick rise and a confusion of lanes. With Memorial Auditorium a block ahead the bus pivots left onto McDowell.

5:13 On the left, a parking lot then a Chevy dealership. On the right another parking lot, then another, then another. Cars everywhere. No people, just cars, waiting. The downtown towers against the right window and then disappears behind a four story parking deck. A cluster of satellite dishes crowd together on an office rooftop.

5:15 At the corner of McDowell and Martin the green expanse of Nash Square spreads out over the driver's left shoulder. A handful of people wander, without apparent intention, across the park. Turning right, the bus squeezes between the walls of Martin Street, gets lucky at the Salisbury traffic light, and then slips against the curb. The doors hiss open. It's still 79 degrees outside but in the shadows it feels cool.

If the bus didn't return to Martin Street, there would be nothing especially spatial about this experience; it unfolds in time as a sequence of impressions, and its spatial quality remains latent until it reconnects with its point of origin and becomes a closed traverse (Figure 12). At that point, everything witnessed becomes synchronous and the previously confounded immigrant exclaims, “I know where I am!” (implying that, to some degree, “I know where I've been”). Space has been surrounded and captured (unlike the tenuously connected scenes lingering along its perimeter, beyond the grasp of its closure); time has collapsed into space. It is still present in the map, but as space. In Minard's Carte Figurative of Napoleon's Russian campaign, time is literally distance, marked out by the rhythm of falling boots and shrinking roll calls. Less dramatically, but more explicitly, the ‘Driving Distance Chart' at the back of the AAA road atlas recognizes each segment as simultaneously a spatial interval (255 miles) and a temporal interval (5 hours and 20 minutes). Curiously — or perhaps predictably — it also tries to subvert its identity as a map, even proclaiming itself a 'chart' (read 'not a map'), but it still looks like a map and it still functions as one.

We can pretend that the dimensions of the map are entirely synchronic, that it has no diachronic quality except as a specimen of technical or methodological evolution; but every cartographer who has grafted a new road onto an old, or dropped the still warm symbols of his latest research onto the cool plate of a twenty year old base map, should know better. The potential for anachronism is enormous; and sometimes it runs amok, as in the map that drags our earliest continental explorers across a fabric of forty-eight American states or ten Canadian provinces ('Native states? What native states?!'). Time is always present in the map because it is inseparable from space. They are alternative and complementary distillations, projections of a space/time of a higher dimensional order. We cannot have a map without thickness in time unless we can have a map without extension in space; we cannot squeeze time out of the map, only into it.
FIGURE 12. A spatio-temporal map of the bus trip, and a planar projection in which the temporal dimension has been collapsed to zero thickness. Space emerges as the product of synchronization (temporal flattening) and the closure of movement.
Presentational Codes
The time of the map, the space of the map, the phenomena materialized in this framework, and the roster of terms and toponyms cast into it are not the map. Expressed through a complex of iconic and linguistic marking schemes, they become the content of the map image; but the map, as we have already pointed out, is much more than this solitary image orphaned on its audience's doorstep. The map image is accompanied by a crowd of signs: titles, dates, legends, keys, scale statements, graphs, diagrams, tables, pictures, photographs, more map images, emblems, texts, references, footnotes, potentially any device of visual expression. The map gathers up this potpourri of signs and makes of it a coherent and purposeful proposition. How these signs come together is the province of a presentational code, which takes as content the relationships among messages resident in the map and offers as expression a structured, ordered, articulated, and affective display: a legitimate discourse.

The more apparent aspects of this code are intrasignificant. It acts on the structure of the map, dividing and proportioning the space of the page, staking out the prospective geometry of blocks, columns, channels, and margins. It proceeds from the primacy of the rectangle, echoing our Euclidean systemization of environment (objects, rooms, buildings, streets, cities), use (trims, folds, stacks, racks, packages, pigeonholes), and reading itself. Within this latent superstructure the ingredients of the map are laid out, ordered by a positional scheme fixing relations of sign to sign and sign to ground and imposing on the map a program, a discursive strategy. Discourse is articulated through emphasis (large or small, prominent or subdued) and elaboration (the relative complexity of signs, the intricacy of their meaning).

But the presentational code works beyond schemes of graphic organization. As it acts on the map as a whole, its effects are manifest in the whole map; and some of these are aimed clearly toward extrasignification. The map has a discursive tone: soft/loud, even/dynamic, compliant/agitated, polite/aggressive, soothing/abrasive. The majority of 'good' maps position themselves on the left side of these oppositions, more conscious of the demands of professional decorum than sensitive to those of their subject matter — or perhaps their intent is to pacify by shading even the most urgent and disturbing themes into Muzak (the reverse is equally incongruous: some of the most thematically mundane maps bludgeon their viewers with symbols that weigh on the page like musket balls). The map also reflects on itself. It asserts its status among maps as mean or lavish, frugal or conspicuous, in its consumption of resources: the scale of its effort, the virtuosity of its craft, its opulence of color, material sensuality, the abundance of surface left unprinted, its sheer size. These gestures are all the more obvious in the atlas, where they can pile up into an object of palpable thickness and weight. So at one extreme we have the Park Avenue hedonism of the World Geo-Graphic Atlas, bound by a cloth-wrapped and gold-imprinted cover a quarter of an inch thick and framed by striking end papers that sprawl over nearly five square feet. At the other extreme we have the grim imperative of The Nuclear War Atlas: an anti-atlas taking the form of a Marxist tabloid, a document one could well imagine run off after hours on a hand-cranked press and thrust at nervous yuppies on street corners, or nailed
to a senator’s door. Government maps are especially status-conscious, announcing
the cost of their printing or the percentage of recycled pulp in their stock in an
effort to disarm the bellicose taxpayer. The map also proclaims its alignment: its
professional camp (a Cartographer’s map as opposed to a Designer’s map), its
institutional allegiance (a National Geographic map as opposed to a Bartholomew,
a Rand McNally as opposed to a AAA), and occasionally the method and aesthetic of
its author (a Bollmann map of Manhattan as opposed to an Anderson). It has a
projective aspect as well: it’s prepared for a particular audience. It is manufac-
tured for the urbane or the profane, the casual or the attentive, for those at ease
with maps or for the cartophobic, for the executive or the mercenary, the well-to-
do or the student, the sighted or the blind. It speaks in their language: in clinical
ascetic, in hot-color High-tech, in journalistic cartoon, in Country and Western, or
suburban rec-room (Figure 13).

The presentational code of the map can’t be explained as a simple set of rules
for graphic organization, especially without defining whose rules. Its action is not
limited to the structural aspects of presentation or confined to affairs of visual
priority and reading sequence (not at least until computers produce maps for
computers). The map isn’t a debating club exercise; it’s set firmly in the real world,
where the abstractions of structure, order, and articulation cannot be cut away
from issues of aesthetics or even belief — any more than the grammar of this text
can be separated from its meaning or the attitudes and values of its authors.

SIGN FUNCTIONS

Maps are about relationships. In even the least ambitious maps, simple presences
are absorbed in multi-layered relationships integrating and disintegrating sign
functions, packaging and repackaging meanings. The map is a highly complex
supersign, a sign composed of lesser signs, or, more accurately, a synthesis of
signs; and these are supersigns in their own right, systems of signs of more specific
or individual function. It’s not that the map conveys meanings so much as unfolds
them through a cycle of interpretation in which it is continually torn down and rebuilt;
and, to be truthful, this is not really the map’s work but that of its user, who creates
a wealth of meaning by selecting and subdividing, combining and recombining its
terms in an effort to comprehend and understand. But, however elaborate, this is
not an unbounded process. Inevitably, it has a lower bound, the most particular
sign function that resists decomposition into constituent signs, and an upper
bound, the integral supersign of the entire map that accesses the realm of
extrasignification; and between these extremes it is stratified. Twofold
stratifications have been repeatedly proposed, and widely accepted, but these
don’t go far enough. If we intend to explain how the map generates and structures
the signing processes by virtue of which it is a map, then we need at least four strata
or levels of signification: which we’ll call elemental, systemic, synthetic, and presentational.

FIGURE 13. In two students’ maps, differences of professional alignment are asserted through subtleties of presenta-
tion: the structure of the page, relations of image to edge and graphic to linguistic sign aggregates, typographic style
and format. (a by Blair Watke, Sir Sandford Fleming College, 1981; b by Patricia Gwaltney, School of Design,
North Carolina State University, 1985.)
At the elemental level, visual occurrences (marks) are linked with geographic occurrences (features) in the set of germinal sign functions announced, if incompletely, by the map legend. At the systemic level, signs (super-signs) are composed of similar elements, forming systems of features and corresponding systems of marks. At the synthetic level (super-supersign?) dissimilar systems enter into an alliance in which they offer meaning to one another and collude in the genesis of an embracing geographic icon. We have at this point a map image; but we don’t have a map without at least title and legend and, more typically, a host of supportive signs assuming textual, pictorial, diagrammatic, and even cartographic forms. Presentation is the level at which the map image is integrated with and positioned in relation to relevant signs in other significant domains, and with which we have finally – or primarily – a complete and legitimized map. We will not take the position that maps are assembled from constituents (perceptually composed) nor that they are dismantled into constituents (perceptually decomposed), but will assume that the map is entered at any level of signification and that interpretation proceeds in either direction, by integration or disintegration, toward mark or toward map. But not necessarily in a straight line. It may be tempting to regard these levels of signification – partly because of the order of their discussion, partly because of the connotations attached to terms like ‘synthesis’ or ‘decomposition’, and partly because of logical predisposition – as stages in a sequential process which, set in motion, moves inexorably toward a condition of greatest or least integration. That is not our view. These interpretive levels are simultaneous states and, although the map may occupy only one of these states at one instant for one observer, they are all equally accessible through a process of perceptual transformation – that is, a restructuring or refiguring of the map.

**Elemental Signs**

Elemental map signs, by definition, cannot be decomposed to yield lesser signs referring to distinct geographic entities. They are the least significant units which have specific reference to features, concrete (Omaha) or abstract (1,000 pigs), within the map image. Appraised in terms of the map’s graphic signifiers, this criterion is easily confused; and we must keep in mind that a sign is not its expression, but the marriage of expression and content. The elemental map sign operates at the lower bound of the map’s content taxonomy, and below this bound reside connotation and characteristic but nothing which can be construed as feature. Strict linguistic models of maps become hopelessly contorted over this issue if their analogies are pushed too far. *Q. – What is the graphic equivalent of a phoneme? A1. – There isn’t one. A2. – It’s a misguided question.* As we have seen, the map is an iconic medium that imposes its behavior on language, not the other way around; and there is no reason to expect graphic signs to observe the rigidly contrived, and separately evolved, protocol of phonetic representation.

At the elemental level, graphic mark (a triangular dot, a blue line) is equated with feature (an occurrence of cobalt, a river). But the elemental sign is not of necessity, univocal. It is common practice in thematic cartography to invent map signs which (as elements) are polymorphic, polychromatic, polyscalar, and in consequence polysemic; and, although each sign generated through such princi-
ples refers to one feature, it expresses simultaneously several of that feature’s attributes. The elemental nature of map signs resides in the singularity of their geographic reference, not the simplicity of their meaning. Visual simplicity is no yardstick either; elemental signifiers are not restricted to visual primitives like dots and lines. They may just as easily assume more complex or more overtly iconic forms: a juxtaposition of flags signifies a border crossing, a bull’s-eye a city, a string of dots and dashes a political boundary. In spite of their complexity these are elemental signs; they are not decomposed in interpretation: one flag signifies nothing without the other; the dot of the bull’s-eye cannot be stripped of its enclosing circle; the patterned line cannot be reduced to Morse Code. None of these will dissolve into autonomous signs.

The autonomy of a sign, and therefore its elemental status, can only be assessed in view of the entire lexicon of the map that accommodates it. Take, for example, the signification of a church with the image of a square surmounted by a crucifix. If the square is also deployed sans crucifix to represent buildings in general, or if other signifiers can be exchanged for the crucifix to denote a variety of building types, then the square is an elemental expression and the crucifix (or anything else) appended to it is sub-elemental. The crucifix is, in effect, a qualifier. Its content is characteristic, not feature; and, regardless of its symbolic potency or self-sufficiency outside the map, in the map it has no geographic reference independent of the square that serves as its vehicle. This is an elemental construct: the syntactical product of two signs, one conjugated with another. Its expression is structurally divisible into two or more signifiers with both separate and joint meaning (building + Christianity = church). If, on the other hand, the square appears only in conjunction with the crucifix, it has no reference independent of their union and they must be jointly taken, not as construct, but as an undifferentiated element similar to the juxtaposed flags. This distinction is an important one because it indicates the presence or absence of an elemental syntax.

How are we to interpret two signifiers which apparently claim equal reference to the same feature, as both blue line and blue-tinted area do in the cartographically standard lake sign? We could regard these as coextensive signs manifest, in Klee’s terms, as medial and active conditions of the same visual plane. This may be valid with respect to possible representations of lakes, but a map can only admit one such possibility to the exclusion of all others: we will not find one lake portrayed as outline, its neighbor as colored area, and the next as both. Neither signifier is redundant in the map which adopts both because, in that context, neither signifies in the other’s absence. An alternative analysis, also from the Formalist perspective, would identify the lake sign as one visual element: formed by its outline and characterized by the color blue (blue in this case has no form but is only an attribute of form). Taken as a basis for explaining how the sign functions, how it relates content and expression, this puts us in an absurd position. A lake is signified by a blue line which closes on itself; and, if within that figure we find a blue tint, then the lake is characterized as having water in it! Both of these postures—the former accepting line and area as simultaneous signifiers of the same signified, and the latter accepting only the line as denoting feature and denying formal status to the area it encloses—refuse to acknowledge what we already take
for granted: that the blue line represents the shoreline of the lake and the blue tint the surface of the lake. Correctly or incorrectly, with naive or deliberate motive, this is how we interpret it and this is how we map it. Of course the shoreline feature, strictly speaking, does not exist except as a boundary between water and land or as a locus at which the depth of the water table reaches zero with respect to the land surface (whatever that is) – and Keates’ objection to the use of boundary signs in street plans applies here as well44 – but if we can accept contour lines, and other isolines, then we have certainly learned to accept the shoreline. The surface of the lake isn’t any more concrete – it is just the boundary between water and air – and the fact that it’s planar (we can water ski on it) rather than linear makes it no less an abstraction. In principle, we regard the land surface and the water table as roughly parallel planes (and as everywhere coextensive) and where these planes intersect, we conventionally demark their intersection with a blue line and place a blue tint to one side of that line (preferably the wet side). What we have then are two abstractions, shoreline and water surface, that we are willing to grant status as features (and to map accordingly) while at the same time recognizing them as two of many aspects or connotations of the lake (or pond or ocean) feature. So we have another type of sign construct (shoreline + surface = lake), only this time both of its components are features. And it turns out that the blue line, in and of itself, does not represent the shoreline after all (although it may represent a river in the same map), but does so only in the presence of a blue tint on one side and none on the other: as part of a sign construct. While the language of the map is drawn from a store of culturally prescribed possibilities, its terms are specifically defined only in application, where the semantic field and syntactical procedures of the individual map form a unique dialect or sémie (Figure 14).

We have tried to demonstrate why we must insist that map signs be considered in terms of both expression and content, and to point out the inadequacy of a Formalist perspective that regards only signifiers and not signs; as well as to suggest the degree to which our conceptualization of phenomena structures, even dictates, the manner in which we represent them. Thus an elemental sign is a sign of elemental meaning, one which refers to an element of the landscape that, however artificial, we are not inclined to tear into constituent bits. With this premise it is possible to build systems of signs, and systemic meaning, from elements.

Sign Systems

By sign system we mean a set or family of similar elemental signs extensive in the space of the map image: a distribution of statistical units, a network of channels, a matrix of areal entities, a nesting of isolines. In this respect, we identify a road system, a river system, or a system of cities. It requires that we interpret many like signs as one sign, again a syntactical product but now one of geographic syntax. The systemic signifier is shaped by the disposition of its corresponding set of phenomena in geodesic space and by the topological transformation that brings this space to the surface of the page. It is also shaped by the way we define elements in the first place. If we were to map, say, the distribution of mountainous regions in the United States by taking as our criterion the (rather over-simplified) notion that all lands elevated 1500 meters or more qualify and that those of lesser
FIGURE 14. Alternative interpretations of the lake sign: a and b from a Formalist perspective, and c as a sign construct. The resemblance between the shoreline in c and pre-lithographic lake signs is anything but coincidental.

elevation do not, we will find in our map a quite different sign system than if we had chosen 2000 meters as our benchmark. It isn’t usually this innocent. What if we were mapping toxic levels of airborne pollutants? What the map says on this subject is determined by what standards, whose standards, we accept as a yardstick of toxicity. In content a system is, after all, a system of features – and features only exist when we recognize them as such (Figure 15).

An arrangement of signifiers on the map constitutes a system only, of course, by virtue of our ability to perceptually organize its elements into something whole. At the systemic level, the bases of affinity among elements are those of implantation (yielding point, line, or area systems) and those formal and chromatic attributes variously termed qualitative, nominal, distinguishing, or differential. Not surprisingly, the latter are as effective among linguistic signs as among iconic signs, distinguishing hydrographic nomenclature, for example, by italic form or blue color. What is surprising, however, is the degree of variation the systemic signifier
FiguRE 15. Typical cartographic sign systems: a a discrete distribution, b a network of signs, c a sign matrix, d nested signs. Regardless of implantation or graphic symbolism, each system structures the landscape in a distinctly different manner.

will tolerate without falling to pieces. Our highway maps, almost to the last, serve up pavement in a smörgåsbord of colors: red, blue, yellow, black, brown, whatever’s in the printer’s pantry. If the object is to represent a coherent highway system, then we could hardly do more to subvert its recognition. But that object is secondary to the marking out of politically-based sub-systems, the sifting out of the relative accomplishments of federal, state, and county treasuries. These maps can’t just be written off as the products of illogical design of aesthetic insensitivity; they are graphic examples of how the extrasignificant functions of the map penetrate to its most practical and seemingly dispassionate design decisions.

The reason we can get away with this sort of thing is that, with the exception of scattered distributions, cartographic sign systems are typified by connectivity. Their elements link up, abut, cradle or nest within one another. They have anatomies. We recognize primarily their structure and utilize the characteristics of their elements mainly to highlight sub-systems which would be otherwise undifferentiated, or to unstick systems of similar structure. That is to say, we attend more to the syntax of the system than the semantic import of its components. We don’t distinguish blue highways from rivers because their signifiers are a little
wider and little less sinuous, and we do so in spite of their most salient attributes of blueness and linearity, but because they are structured differently as systems, because they are manifestly different landscapes. The system is a landscape because, while the element simply is somewhere, the system goes somewhere; and, in doing so, it structures the space of the map.

**Synthesis**

There is no such thing as a monothematic map. Consider that emblem of thematic cartography: an array of graduated circles against the barest outline of subject area. This map image signifies at least the shoreline (usually elaborated beyond any conceivable utility), the water surface, the land surface, and probably one or more proprietary boundaries (in which case we've differentiated several political states as well), and — almost forgot — whatever it is the graduated circles represent. Stripping off the circles leaves us with an absolute minimum of three sign systems, and typically twice that many, lurking behind the ostensibly servile trace of the pen. Sure, cartographers design maps for cartographers — as architects design buildings for architects and politicians make laws for politicians — but to call this monothematic is going too far. Can we really take that much for granted? Are we so thoroughly hypnotized that we can't even see the map?

Maps are about relationships. In other words, they are about how one landscape — a landscape of roads, of rivers, of cities, government, sustenance, poison, the good life, of whatever — is positioned in relation to another. The map synthesizes these diverse landscapes, projecting them onto and into one another, with less than subtle hints that one is correlative to another or that this is an agent or effect of that. The map can't simply say that something is present (present in what?) or that it is distributed in a certain way (distributed in relation to what?); it's after the big picture, the kind of insight that only comes with an omnipresent viewpoint and the power to choose what inhabits the world. At this level the map image as a whole (whole in content if not necessarily in scope) is the supersign, and the various systems it resolves to are its constituent signs. And signs can only have meaning in relation to other signs. Merleau-Ponty puts it this way:

What we have learned from Saussure is that, taken singly, signs do not signify anything, and that each one of them does not so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs. Since the same can be said for all other signs, we may conclude that language is made of differences without terms; or more exactly, that the terms of language are engendered only by the differences which appear among them. This is a difficult idea, because common sense tells us that if term A and term B do not have any meaning at all, it is hard to see how there could be a difference of meaning between them; and that if communication really did go from the whole of the speaker's language to the whole of the hearer's language, one would have to know the language in order to learn it. But the objection is of the same kind as Zeno's paradoxes; and as they are overcome by the act of movement, it is overcome by the use of speech.45

What is signified by any system in the last illustration? Nothing. If they were juxtaposed with a sign system that we could recognize, or furnished with a
nomenclature that allowed us to supply that system, they could become signs, not by virtue of any abstract geographic reference but in relation to another sign system that holds meaning for the observer. If you have to resort to the map title to determine that this map of teenage suicides takes place in Los Angeles, then you’re probably too far removed to care. What the map does (and this is its most important internal sign function) is permit systems to open and maintain a dialogue with one another. It is obvious why a road folds back on itself when we can see the slope it ascends, or why two roads parallel one another a stone’s throw apart when we can see them on opposite banks of a river, or why an interstate cramps into a tense circle when we can see the city and its rush-hour torment. We know the behavior of this system so well, in fact, that we can take it as an index of other systems in the total absence of their direct representation. On the face of it, the map confirms these understandings; but they are understandings that have already been created by maps.

The gestalt of each sign system is positioned against the semiotic ground of another sign system, or a sub-synthesis of systems. The roads in the state highway map aren’t grounded against an insignificant white surface; they’re grounded against North Carolina or Illinois or Texas. What lies between the roads isn’t aether (it isn’t 40 lb. Springhill Offset either): it’s tobacco and loblolly pine and patches of red dirt rolling over the Piedmont, or rugose mats of corn dotted with crows and John Deeres, or relentless miles of sand and prickly pear rippling in the heat. There is nothing in the map that fails to signify. Not even in a map of the Moon. So the flow of water is interpreted against the ground of land form, and vice versa; and the pattern of forestation is interpreted against the ground of both, as both and each are interpreted against it. In the synthesized map image, every sign system is potentially figure and every sign system is potentially ground (Figure 16). There is nothing inherently or irrevocably ground about even the land mass: try telling a truckload of surfers that the shoreline in the highway map is just a backdrop to the road system. They’ll tell you that you have it all backwards.

The map image is a synthesis of spatially and temporally registered gestellten, each a synthesis in its own right; and to pretend that this whole is no more than the sum of its parts, or that we can do more than recommend a certain alignment of their priorities, is to reduce our concept of the map to that of a diagram. No degree of thematic constriction can silence the conversation among map signs. The map models the world as an interplay of systems and presents it to us as a multi-voiced analogue, with harmonies and dissonances clearly discernible. Through the map we observe how systems respond to one another, and appraise the nature and degree of that response. We explore the world through the map, not as vicarious Amazon travellers hacking across the pages of National Geographic, but by remaking it in our own chosen terms and wringing as much meaning as we can out of what we’ve made.

**Presentation**

In presentation the map attains the level of discourse. Its discursive form may be as simple as a single map image rendered comprehensible by the presence of title, legend, and scale; or as complex as those in *The New State of the World Atlas*.48
hurling multiple map images, diagrams, graphs, tables, and texts at their audience in a raging polemic. It may be as diverse as vacation triptiks, rotating cardboard star finders, perspex-slabbed shopping center guides, chatty supermarket video displays, or place mats for formica diner tables. Presentation is more than placing the map image in the context of other signs; it's placing the map in the context of its audience.

Robert Scholes identifies discourse, in the arena of literature, as:

... those aspects of a text which are appraisive, evaluative, persuasive, or rhetorical, as opposed to those which simply name, locate, and recount. We also speak of "forms of discourse" as generic models for utterances of particular sorts. Both the sonnet and the medical prescription can be regarded as forms of discourse that are bound by rules which cover not only their verbal procedures but their social production and exchange as well.49
Figure 17. An exceptionally compact and intense presentation that impresses the urgency of its theme. The proliferation of weapons surrounds the non-nuclear island of Mongolia, overflows the borders of the United States, and even demands the rescanning of Europe. Virtually all of the northern hemisphere is colored red and darkened by sinister pictograms. Textual and diagrammatic statements propel the map's message. (Plate 8, "Shares in the Apocalypse," from *The New State of the World Atlas* by Michael Kidron and Ronald Segal; published in the U.S. by Simon and Schuster, and in the U.K. by Pluto Press.)

And he notes that the:

... coding of discourse is a formal strategy, a means of structuring that enables the maker of the discourse to communicate certain kinds of meaning.50

Discourse is preceded by a code of presentation, and by the notion of an audience capable of applying that code to reach meaning through structure. For us, this means that the idea of 'percipient' must be extended to the entire culture of map-makers and map-users and include, as one of its most prominent aspects, their ability to generate and utilize strategic codes that permit maps to speak about the world rather than simply of it.

In bringing the map to this point we make it entirely accessible to the processes of extrasignification, and subject to their appropriation. It can be seized and carried off whole (necessarily whole) to serve the motives of mythic representation. The plan of the shopping center, color-coded, with shops topically and alphabetically organized and numerically keyed — a paradigm of logical graphic representation for the illogical masses — becomes an expression of the fact that "We've got it all: trendy clothes, trendy shoes, books, records, tools, cameras, jewelry, fondue pots, exotic coffees, pizza, and parking." The diner placemat
ceases to be a regional guide to places of interest and focal points of recreation (it was never meant as a gravy blotter or it wouldn't have been printed in the first place) and becomes the Chamber of Commerce's propaganda vehicle, complete with smiling checker-shirted fishermen tugging against smiling bass the size of Volkswagens. Which brings us back to where we started. The map is simultaneously an instrument of communication — intrasignification, given the benefit of doubt — and an instrument of persuasion — extrasignification and its propensity toward myth.

Presentation locates the map front and center in all this action, at the vertex of both planes of signification. It's not a quirk of house style that populates the National Geographic map with maize-laden Cherokee or the state highway map with trees, bees, civil war artifacts, and cavorting tourists. It's the deliberate activation of popular visual discourse. It's not just pragmatism or objectivity that dresses the topographic map with reliability diagrams and magnetic error diagrams and multiple referencing grids, or the thematic map with the trappings of f-scaled symbols and psychometrically divided greys. It's the urge to claim the map as a scientific instrument and accrue to it all the mute credibility and faith that this demands. Presentation, as the end and the beginning of the map, closes the loop of its design. It makes the map whole and, in doing so, prepares it for a role that begins where its avowed attention to symbolism, geodesic accuracy, visual priority, and graphic organization leaves off. It injects the map into its culture.

NOTES

1 As will become more apparent below, it is not irrelevant that were our legend a photograph in the National Geographic Magazine, it is this pendent sentence which would be called the 'legend.' At the Geographic, caption writing is an art practiced by those in the Legends Division.

2 Arthur Robinson and Randall Sale, Elements of Cartography, Third Edition, Wiley, New York, 1969, 270. It is instructive that despite their indispensability, legends are granted but a paragraph in the chapter on design, where they play the role of illustrations of the principles of figure-ground relationships. In light of the discussion, below, of the 'naturalization' function of myth, it is not surprising that Robinson and Sale should have said, 'naturally indispensable.'

3 Ibid.

4 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Hill and Wang, New York, 1972, 109. This book, felicitously translated by Annette Lavers, consists of a number of 'mythologies' followed by the long essay, 'Myth Today.' It is from this latter that this reference and the following quotation come.

5 Ibid., 115–116.

6 Ibid., 115.

7 Ibid., 131.

8 This is even more obvious at the county level: it would be genuinely helpful to distinguish counties prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages from those selling beer and wine and mixed drinks. But in fact the carefully delineated counties are not distinguished in any way. Then why show them? It is not a question that can be answered at the level of language. Only on the level of myth is their presence explicable, where North Carolina (and any other state), defender of states' rights (as it has to be), can be seen to dissolve in turn into its constituent counties, their boundaries an unscreened application of the yellow used to demarcate the sovereignties surrounding North Carolina, leaking, as it were, into the state via these county edges.

9 The issue reduces the editors of The Times Atlas of the World, Seventh Comprehensive Edition (Times Books, London, 1985) to stuttering incomprehensibility: "In recent years much political significance has been attached to the manner in which international boundaries are depicted and the way names are spelled in atlases. The position of The Times as publishers of this and all other atlases has been stated repeatedly and unequivocally. To attempt to judge the rights and wrongs of territorial disputes is beyond the function of the publishers of an atlas ... In its atlases The Times aims to show the territorial situation obtaining at the time of publication without regard to the de jure situation in contentious areas
or rival claims of contending parties. The aim has always been to inform, to strive for accuracy and to be as up to date as possible..." (viii) and much more gobbledygook of this tone. What can it mean? They do not attempt to judge, but they do attempt to show the situation obtaining: and how do they determine this without judging? With its pompous self-serving attitude this comes close to a perfect example of doublespeak, avowing everything while saying nothing much at all.

North Carolina publishes the edition size and cost per copy on all public documents. The 1986-available Public Transportation Guide -- the map's second edition -- carries a 1985 date. Curiously, while the governor's wife's photograph graces the highway map, it is missing from the guide, where he stands alone.


These examples come from the verso of 'Central America,' published as a supplement to the National Geographic, April 1986, 466A.

The Central America map is as cited above. That of the Central Plains comes from the verso of 'Central Plains,' published as a supplement to the National Geographic, September 1985, 352A.

The Nuclear War Atlas, a two by four foot sheet with 28 two-color maps recto and text verso is published by The Society for Human Exploration, Victoriaville, Quebec. Our copy is undated.


The New York Picture Map was created by Hermann Bollman for Pictorial Maps Incorporated, New York. In our copy, the recto carries Bollmann's rendering of midtown Manhattan in five colors, and the verso a two-color planimetric map of the city of New York. Approximately 34 by 43 inches (86 x 100 cm), the map sheet folds to fit a jacket that includes forty-eight pages of text. It is not dated.

R.L. Gregory, in Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing (McGraw-Hill, New York and Toronto, second edition, 1973, 160-176), identifies personal experience and the geometry of environment as key ingredients of our ability to decode perspective transcriptions. He remarks that: "In connection with the non-Western people, it is perhaps worth adding that they make little or nothing of drawings or photographs of familiar objects, and this was also true of the blind man made to see. It is likely that perspective cues are made use of only after considerable experience, when they are related to touch, and that it is only then that appropriate perspective cues give rise to distortions of size in flat figures."

In 'Pictorial Perception and Culture' (Scientific American, November 1972, 82 and extent).
whole metaphor). Some authors invert this terminology. Within written language, distinctions among
metaphoric types are numerous; but their applications to graphic signs are largely unexplored and of
questionable utility.

Barbara S. Bartz, 'Type Variation and the Problem of Cartographic Type Legibility – Part One,' in
('analogous') characteristics of letterforms in the cartographic context as those referring to location
(point location, linear and areal extent, shape and orientation of feature), quality, quantity, and value
(relative importance).

Southworth and Southworth, op. cit., 189, reproduce two examples; Kevin Lynch reproduces

Paschal C. Viglionese, 'The Inner Functioning of Words: Iconicity in Poetic Language,' in Visible
Language, vol. XIX, no. 3, 1985, 373–386, foregrounds these potentials in a series of analyses attentive
to the pre-phonographic origins of linguistic expression and the cultural bases of iconicity.

These examples are from J.B. Post, An Atlas of Fantasy, Mirage Press, Baltimore, 1973. A revised

We refer here to the maps occupying pages 80–81 and 148–149 of Goode’s World Atlas, sixteenth

One might reflect here on the currency of data drawn from geographic information systems, the
difference in time between their point of acquisition and point of use, and the liability potentially
incurred. Given the naive tendency of most users to accept any electronically-coded information as
current, the onus is clearly on the purveyor of information to inform the user to the contrary. Political
bubble-bursting notwithstanding, this is a responsibility that the system manager ignores at his own
peril: uneartbing a telephone cable is one thing; cracking open an oil tanker is quite another.

38–64, argues convincingly for a 'time-space' framework of geographic description, employing the
Hägerstrand time-geographic model and its system of graphic notation. We have used this system here
to construct Figure 12.

This map is reproduced, with some fanfare, in Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative

The example at hand concludes the North American Road Atlas published by the American Auto­
mobile Association, Falls Church, Virginia, 1984.

The World Geo-Graphic Atlas: A Composite of Man’s Environment, edited and designed by Herbert
Bayer, was produced in 1953 for the Container Corporation of America. Described in the foreword as
"an effort to contribute modestly to the realms of education and good taste," it is, as a gesture of
corporate good will or a device of corporate promotion (take your pick), an exceptionally lavish and
ambitious volume.

Op. cit. While hardly likely to inspire professional envy among most cartographers, this atlas
assumes the form appropriate to its purpose. It would be difficult to imagine as an expensive
coffee-table book except, perhaps, as a device of the blackest humor.

This term is more widely accepted among graphic designers than among linguists. Thomas
Ockerse and Hans Van Dijk, Semiotics and Graphic Design Education, (Visible Language, vol. XIII,
no. 4, 1979, 965) describe the supersign as: “a sign which allows for a complex simultaneity of possible
interpreters.” In De-Sign/Super-Sign (Semiotica, vol. 52/3–4, 1984, 251–2), Ockerse elaborates on: “The
problem of defining the so-called ‘super-sign’. This means to provide a rational system for
communication wherein the system sums the major mode of signification. The participating elements
within this complex whole contribute bits of information. The whole is actually a sign made up of other
signs; more precisely, the supersign is a sign system. This system is intended to include all signs that
operate within the system or that can/will influence the system: the bits, their structural relations, the
sum representations created by the juxtapositions of micro- and macro-elements (bits to bits, bits to
groups, groups to groups, groups to the whole, the whole to others, etc.). Involved are potential layers
and levels of information (in terms of importance, denotative and connotative references) for the
reader/viewer. The supersign is like a text; but its potential is even intertextual, a characteristic of signs.
In fact, the supersign concept even provides a system that invites the reader/viewer to become an active
participant in a generative process.” It will become apparent that, in our analysis, the term ‘system’ has
a more specific meaning than that intended by Ockerse; but this does not indicate disagreement over
the nature or function of the supersign.

C. Grant Head, 'The Map as Natural Language: A Paradigm for Understanding' (Cartographica,
vol. 21, no. 1, 1978, 1–32), stresses two levels of interpretation, citing the following: Barbara Bartz
Petchenik, 'From Place to Space: The Psychological Achievement of Thematic Mapping' (The American
Cartographer, vol. 6, 1979, 5–12); Judy M. Olson, 'A co-ordinated approach to map communication
improvement' (American Cartographer, vol. 3, 1976, 151–159); and Jacques Bertin, 'La test de base de la
graphique' (Bulletin du Comité Français de Cartographie, no. 79, 1979, 3-18). Among these, however, it turns out that only Petchenik's analysis is entirely restricted to two levels ('being-in-place' and 'knowing-about-space'): Olson's 'Level One' and 'Level Two' are supplemented by a 'Level Three' that is curiously distinct in its attention to meanings; and Bertin, in Semiology of Graphics (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983, 141 and 151), acknowledges a variety of 'intermediate' levels between the 'elementary' and the 'overall.' Schlichtmann (op. cit., 25 and 27-28) identifies three levels of signification — minimal signs, macrosigns, and texts — which seem to differ more in extent than degree of synthesis. While none of these analyses recognizes a presentational, or discursive, level of signification, our terms are probably in closest agreement with Schlichtmann's.

Our concern here is not the neurological processing of stimuli, but the interpretation of visual signs. The map user, regardless of — and oblivious to — physiological means, is obviously capable of both composing and decomposing complex signs; one of these abilities is of little use without the other. There seems to be a tendency among cartographers to regard perception as an exclusively constructive — even additive — process, encouraged perhaps by an affinity for mechanistic perceptual models that, for the most part, simply invert the biological metaphors of technological design (offering cameras for eyes, telecommunications systems for neural systems, or industrial robot vision for human cognition), and driven by a virtual obsession with the measurement of responses to largely decontextualized cartographic expressions. But the issue at hand is one of interpretive strategy: a strategy that operates on the organization of meanings, and the construction and deconstruction of meaningful structures. Its application is bidirectional and comprehensive.

This subject is given thorough treatment by Jacques Bertin, op. cit., 195-268 and 321-408.


The familiar example of the musical theme, which retains its identity despite transposition to another key or rescoring for a different ensemble of instruments, is remarkably evocative of the cartographic sign system that retains its identity throughout numerous topological and scalar transformations, spatial re-orientations, and symbolic representations. Clearly, the recognizable whole, in both cases, is an artifact of structure rather than sensation — a gestalt.

Kidron and Segal, op. cit. This atlas presents fifty-seven map plates, and corresponding micro-essays, addressing urgent (and frequently controversial) socio-political issues of global scope. Its overcrowded page layouts, animated symbolism, disturbing colors, pointed titles, and terse text form the ingredients of an acerbic discourse on the corruption and repression of the modern nation-state.


RESUME Toute carte est à la fois un ensemble de signes et un signe en soi. Elle est un instrument de description d'objets, d'événements et de lieux, et un instrument de persuasion au sujet de ces choses, ses cartographes et elle même. Comme tout signe elle est le résultat de codes, conventions qui indiquent les relations entre le contenu et la forme dans un cadre sémiotique donné. Les codes qui sous-tendent la carte sont aussi nombreux que ses motifs et pleinement intégrés à la culture qui les fait naître et les utilise. Des codes intrasignifiants régissent la formation de l'image cartographique et
l'utilisation du langage visible et leur agencement. Ces codes agissent au travers plusieurs niveaux d'intégration en activant un répertoire de conventions de représentation et de procédés syntaxiques qui vont des valeurs symboliques des signes individuels au cadre élabore du discours cartographique. Des codes extrasignifiants régissent la perception des cartes achevées en tant que véhicules de signes exprimant des valeurs, des buts, des esthétique et des statuts sociaux et politiques, instruments du mythe moderne. Les signes cartographiques et les cartes en tant que signes reposent fondamentalement sur des conventions, n'ont de signification qu'en relation avec d'autres signes, et ne peuvent être détachées de leur contexte culturel et des motifs de leurs auteurs.


RESUMEN Cada mapa es a la vez una síntesis de signos y un signo en sí: Es instrumento de ilustración – de objetos, eventos y lugares – y un instrumento de persuasión – en cuanto a éstos, sus productores y de sí mismo. Al igual que cualquier otro signo, es el producto de claves: las convenciones que indican las relaciones entre contenido y expresión en una circunstancia semiótica dada. Son tan numerosas las claves que tiene un mapa, como sus motivos, y tan cabalmente naturalizadas dentro de la cultura que la genera y las explota. Las claves intrasignificantes controlan la formación del icon cartográfico, la colocación del lenguaje visible y la manera de su presentación en conjunto. Estas filtran por varios niveles de integración, activando un repertorio de convenciones representativas y procedimientos sintácticos que van desde los símbolos de marcadores individuales, hasta los marcos complicados de comunicación cartográfica. Las claves extrasignificantes controlan la utilización de mapas enteros como vehículos de signos para una expresión social y política – de valores, de metas, de estética y status – como la media del mito moderno. Los signos de mapas, y los mapas como signos, dependen fundamentalmente de convenciones, comunican solamente en relación a otros signos y nunca están libres de su contexto cultural ni de los motivos de quien los elabora.